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ABSTRACT 
This thesis approaches the study of identity politics in Latin America through the 
two cases of Guatemala and Bolivia. Both countries have similar histories of racism, 
indigenous demographic majorities, indigenous mobilization, democratization moments, 
and institutions, and yet the 1999 Guatemalan referendum failed where the 2009 Bolivian 
referendum succeeded at delivering indigenous rights. Why? This thesis seeks to 
understand Latin America’s indigenous movements and identity politics with 
implications for conflict resolution or management, combating inequality, and 
expanding notions of democratic governance. The leading explanations for indigenous 
movements and politics in Latin America tend to revolve around institutions, social 
movements, and party systems. However, by examining national histories, 
contemporary news sources, relevant scholarship, and original materials from relevant 
political actors, this study proposes another explanation. It stipulates that the 
success of an indigenous movement in constitutionalizing its demands rests 
upon the unification of the movement, its programmatic appeal, and its ability 
to form coalitions with meaningful political allies, thus explaining the disparities in 
the Guatemalan and Bolivian movements. The Pan-Mayan movement did not 
meet the preponderance of criteria whereas Bolivia’s indigenous movement did, 
highlighting the importance of unity and broad appeal in diversifying the region’s 
politics. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND SIGNIFICANCE  
Indigenous movements have been a lively component of Latin America’s political 
landscape since Imperial times and the present is no different. Understanding their nature 
has been central to managing conflict, decoding the direction of national policies, better 
understanding the region’s historical tides, and helping expand notions of democracy and 
constitutional design beyond traditionally Northern Trans-Atlantic centered models.1 As 
far as resolving long running conflicts and racial discrimination, indigenous entries into 
national and international politics have been key to addressing persistent injustices in 
countries such as Guatemala, Ecuador, and Bolivia, which underwent national shifts 
toward more inclusive societies.2 Political exclusion has been an enduring feature of 
politics throughout the Americas, where monuments enshrine white conquerors while 
shunting pre-Columbian or other non-white groups, creating national myths that 
underwrite the political-economic basis for the domination of white descendants.3  
 
1 Kay B. Warren, Indigenous Movements and Their Critics: Pan-Maya Activism in Guatemala 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), X–XII; Raúl L. Madrid, The Rise of Ethnic Politics in 
Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3; Peter Winn, Americas: The Changing 
Face of Latin America and the Caribbean, 3rd ed (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006), XI; 
Donna Lee Van Cott, The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America 
(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 8; Gilda M. Waldman, “Historical Memory and 
Present-Day Oblivion: The Mapuche Conflict in Post-Dictatorial Chile,” Time & Society, vol. 21, no. 1 
(2012): 56–57; Amy H. Liu and Kevin Peters, “The Hanification of Xinjiang, China: The Economic Effects 
of the Great Leap West,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, vol. 17, no. 2 (2017): 265–80. 
2 Winn, Americas, XV; Marc Becker, Pachakutik: Indigenous Movements and Electoral Politics in 
Ecuador (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 12–13; Edgar Esquit, “Nationalist 
Contradictions: Pan-Mayanism, Representations of the Past, and the Reproduction of inequalities in 
Guatemala,” in Decolonizing Native Histories: Collaboration, Knowledge, and Language in the Americas, 
ed. Florencia Mallon (Dunham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), 196; Andrés Calla and Khantuta 
Muruchi, “Transgressions and Racism: The Struggle over a New Constitution in Bolivia,” in Histories of 
Race and Racism, ed. Laura Gotkowitz (Dunham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 299.  
3 Mala Htun, Inclusion without Representation in Latin America: Gender Quotas and Ethnic 
Reservations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016): 1; Arturo Taracena Arriola, “From 
Assimilation to Segregation: Guatemala 1800–1944,” in Histories of Race and Racism, ed. Laura 
Gotkowitz (Dunham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 95; David A. Graham, “The Stubborn Persistence 
of Confederate Monuments,” The Atlantic, April 26, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2016/04/the-stubborn-persistence-of-confederate-monuments/479751/. 
2 
These notions of race, political-economic participation, and national legitimacy are 
intertwined with ideas surrounding constitutional designs and the meanings of citizenship 
as seen in places like Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. In these states, for example, citizenship 
often followed a Hispanic, Christian, and European-centric model that eschewed any other 
forms of cultural and communal expression with the aim of either assimilating or 
segregating indigenous communities and abrogating their rights.4 Racial notions also had 
impacts upon foreign policymaking in Latin America, as exemplified in the relations 
between the United States and Costa Rica where the Americans saw the Costa Rican state 
as a Jeffersonian, white, and Christian nation.5 The shared racial conception between the 
two countries may have moderated the United States’ response to the Costa Rican civil war 
in 1948 in contrast with its other interventions in Cold War Latin America.6 The common 
thread among these highlights how race, racialized hierarchies, and their codification either 
through laws or norms perpetuate inequality and exclusion, to the detriment of large 
portions of the Americas, and shape international relations. 
From this perspective, this paper argues the centrality of understanding how ethnic 
identity, political mobilization, and constitutionalization intermingle to create the vast 
array of nation-states one sees today. It focuses on how indigenous movements influence 
national constitutions in the region as these documents represent the highest form of law 
within most sovereign states and therefore codify the identity and hierarchization that 
organize their societies. Out of the world’s 193 nations, ninety-four recognize indigenous 
peoples through constitutional fiat, underscoring the broader international dimension of 
 
4 For Bolivia: Brooke Larson, “Forging the Unlettered Indian,” in Histories of race and Racism: The 
Andes and Mesoamerica from Colonial Times to the Present, ed. Laura Gotkowitz (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press 2011), 134–56; For Ecuador: Carlos de la Torre, “Racism in Education and the 
Construction of Citizenship in Ecuador,” Race & Class, vol. 42, no. 2 (October 2000), 33–45; For Peru: 
Mariella I. Arredondo, “Born Indigenous, Growing Up Mestizos: Schooling and Youth in Arequipa, Peru,” 
in Mestizaje and Globalization, eds. Stefanie Wickstrom and Philip D. Young (Tucson, AZ: The University 
of Arizona Press, 2014), 77–91.  
5 Kyle Longley, The Sparrow and The Hawk: Costa Rica and The United States during the Rise of 
José Figueres (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1997), 12; Bruce M. Wilson, Costa 
Rica: Politics, Economics, and Democracy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 13. 
6 Longley, The Sparrow and The Hawk, 4.  
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understanding how these communities obtain such protections.7 It must also be recognized 
that not all groups obtain or demand constitutional provisions. An appreciable number 
make do, or are content, with enabling legislation that serves a very similar purpose, albeit 
with lesser degrees of legal or political resilience. 
Given these notions, consider the following: Guatemala and Bolivia are both home 
to Latin America’s largest national shares of indigenous populations, with estimates 
ranging from fifty to sixty percent all throughout their respective national histories.8 They 
experienced slightly different independence struggles that otherwise created similar states: 
oligarchic republics ruled by Spanish-descended white minorities who identified 
themselves with either assimilationist or segregationist nationalisms.9 They both 
underwent swings between segregationist conservative and assimilationist liberal 
governments whose elites were sustained by their privileged positions in landownership, 
agricultural production, and domestic and international trade.10 Both nations experienced 
periods of military intervention into national politics or outright rule and were heavily 
influenced by the United States’ actions in the region.11  
Noticeably, Guatemala and Bolivia followed different paths during the Cold War 
but arrived at contemporaneous democratizing moments in the 1980s and 1990s albeit 
under different regimes and conditions.12 Most importantly, both saw the multi-decade rise 
 
7 Katharina Holzinger et al., “The Constitutionalization of Indigenous Group Rights, Traditional 
Political Institutions, and Customary Law,” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 52, no. 12 (2018): 2.  
8 Richard N. Adams, “The Evolution of Racism in Guatemala: Hegemony, Science, and 
Antihegemony,” Histories of Anthropology Annual, vol. 1 (2005): 133; John L. Hammond, “Indigenous 
Community Justice in the Bolivian Constitution of 2009,” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 33 (2011): 650. 
9 Adams, “The Evolution of Racism in Guatemala,” 133; Herbert S. Klein, A Concise History of 
Bolivia, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 144–49. 
10 Greg Grandin, Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2000), 22, 26-34; Klein, A Concise History of Bolivia, 153, 156–7. 
11 Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in 
Guatemala (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2005); Cole Blasier, The Hovering 
Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America 1910–1985 (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), 151–210; James F. Siekmeier, “Trailblazer Diplomat: Bolivian 
Ambassador Víctor Andrade Uzquiano’s Efforts to Influence U.S. Policy, 1944–162,” Diplomatic History, 
vol. 28, no. 3 (June 2004): 385–406.  
12 Guatemala was noticeably impacted by a long-running civil war whereas Bolivia did not experience 
significant civil violence throughout and after the Cold War. 
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of indigenous movements and politics that based themselves on similarly powerful pre-
Colonial traditions.13 And finally, in both countries these movements reached similar 
constitutional crossroads in pushing to overturn centuries of oppression and 
marginalization of indigenous populations that culminated in respective national referenda. 
Despite these broad parallels, in Guatemala the Mayan peoples were denied expanded 
constitutional recognition, freedoms, and rights whereas Bolivia’s indigenous peoples 
wildly succeeded at inaugurating a plurinational constitution.14 Why? Why did these 
outcomes diverge so much and what does that generally say about ethnic-based movements 
in other parts of the Americas and the world? 
To answer these questions, the following section will first define key terms in order 
to describe the topography that the Pan-Mayan and Bolivian indigenous movements had to 
navigate during their respective constitutional drives and review the relevant literature in 
order to lay the groundwork for a hypothesis.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Terms such as hegemonic system, political-economics, elites, and race and racism 
will be employed to provide the reader the outlines of the environments within which ethnic 
movements operate. Therefore, for the purposes of this study this section will standardize 
the meanings of these concepts that will be integral to conveying this perspective on 
indigenous politics and constitutionalizing. Additionally, it will also explore the debates 
around indigenous movements and identity.  
 
13 Nancy Postero, The Indigenous State: Race, Politics, and Performance in Plurinational Bolivia 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2017); Kay B. Warren, Indigenous Movements and Their 
Critics: Pan-Maya Activism in Guatemala (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).  
14 For Guatemala’s results: Kay B. Warren, “Voting Against Indigenous Rights in Guatemala: 
Lessons from the 1999 Referendum,” in Indigenous Movements, Self-Representation, and the State in Latin 
America, eds. Kay B. Warren and Jean E. Jackson (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2003). For 
Bolivia’s results: “Bolivia: 2009 Constitutional Referendum Results,” Political Database of the Americas, 
Georgetown University, updated January 25, 2009, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Bolivia/
refconstit09.html. 
5 
1. Explaining Hegemony, Race and Racism, and Identity 
When this thesis uses terms such as hegemony, hegemonic system or arrangements, 
and hierarchization of various concepts relating to different modes of power within politics 
they are borrowed from Florencia Mallon’s conceptions of hegemony.15 Harkening to 
Antonio Gramsci’s conceptions of power, hierarchization, and notions of coercion and 
consensus stemming from convergence around an ideology; Mallon posits instead 
hegemony as a process. In Mallon’s view, hegemony is the continuous contestation over 
the meaning, trappings, and legitimation of power in all forms whether they be political, 
economic, or cultural and so on.16  
At the end of that process, is a precariously balanced systemic equilibrium that only 
last for as long as the interested actors accept it as legitimate. This equilibrium is 
hegemony.17 This accepted equilibrium includes overriding agreements as to how a nation 
sees itself, its symbols, how power and resources are to be distributed and managed, and 
the shape of societal norms that justify any number of inequalities and distribution of 
political economic power.18 Other properties of this conception of hegemony involve 
continual struggle at multiple levels and scales for it involves politics at the subaltern level 
outside of the government-civil society relationship such as those solely within civil society 
and how it organizes itself outside officialdom.  
Thus, it allows for the influences of ethnic groups, non-governmental actors, and 
illicit actors among others to enter the arena of hegemonic competition and contest its 
meanings and trappings on equal footing with the state. This osmotic and contested 
relationship between local subaltern leaders—mayors, councilors, and indigenous 
caciques, etc.—and national ones—presidents, dictators, juntas, etc.—is what defines 
hegemony in terms of how power, political or economic, is distributed and how it is 
 
15 Florencia E. Mallon, Peasant and the Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995): 6.  
16 Mallon, 6. 
17 Mallon, 6–7. 
18 A fusion of Mallon’s concept of hegemony and philosophical observations made by Thomas 
Picketty, Capital and Ideology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020): 1.  
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exercised. The momentarily agreed upon reasons for inequalities become the status quo 
distribution of political and economic rights, privileges, and power. Thus, this agreement 
is hegemony.  
In Mallon’s definition of hegemony, the core hegemon can be any group(s) or 
class(es) that have accumulated the largest concentrations or densest networks of political, 
economic, and cultural influence over the state and imprinted their identity onto the 
national ethos. As it shall be revealed in the following chapters, these factors are merely a 
constellation that can be combined in a myriad of ways to produce dominance within a 
nation state. As a result, all other groups not tightly woven within the core hegemonic 
sphere are then considered peripheral and experience an unequal power relationship with 
the core which is justified in any number of ways. This concept is important to our study 
not as a factor unto itself but more so as the topography that shapes the struggle and 
competition between core and peripheral groups. This is mainly decided by the material 
relationships and resources that imbue political alliances that enable their demands and 
preferences to become the dominant ideas that influence the conceptualization of the state 
and its identity, namely, for example, its constitution and governing norms.19  
Through those processes, groups become part of or antagonists against the ruling 
coalitions who have privileged monopoly over the state, economic resources, and the 
ability to write the differential rules that govern the use of force and how the culture is 
expressed.20 This is what this study means by hegemonic system, core versus periphery, 
and elites versus the subaltern classes or groups. And because elites are bounded by their 
benefits from dominating a country’s internal hegemonic system, they are incentivized to 
defend it persuasively or coercively in any way they deem necessary. This is the basis for 
struggle and need to gain a position where one, for example, can rewrite a constitution or 
hold sway over a government in order to safeguard one’s privileges or obtain greater rights 
or protections. The manner in which this study highlights these hegemonic struggles is by 
identifying the cleavages in the subject cases and tracing their evolution across the life-
 
19 Grandin, Blood of Guatemala, 13–14. 
20 Grandin, 14. 
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span of the case country. Their historical backgrounds can lay bare the challenges and 
incentives for why the hegemonic challengers arose in the first place and how and why the 
core hegemonic counter-reaction occurred the way it did.  
These hegemonic structures in turn depend on conceptualizing and intertwining the 
idea of race with ascriptive political and economic roles. For example, a number of 
societies in Latin America are racially hierarchized as part of their colonial legacy. As it 
will be seen in the case histories, labor and ownership roles were often equated with race 
and these in turn acquired political overtones that influenced the growth of state and civil-
society structures. Thus, race in Latin America was intersectional by converging ideas of 
proper economic, political, and gender roles with ascriptive properties such as phenotypic 
types or other cultural attributes. To define race and racism is hard under any 
circumstances, but for the purposes of this thesis race and racism are “rooted in 
consciousness, in the cognitive process that attributes social significance to the arbitrary 
fact of skin color.”21 These constructs provide a person with the heuristics to associate 
certain skin colors or other physical features with mythologized stereotypes that justify a 
given type of power relationship or hierarchy. These notions may be justified through 
pseudo-scientific arguments that presupposed primordialist or natural biological 
differences between different phenotypes ascribing to them political and economic values 
and roles.22 The mythologies can range between segregationist outlooks—the absolute 
separation and subordination of inferior groups—or assimilationist ones where out-groups 
can only obtain acceptance through the shedding of their identities and the adoption of the 
dominant ones.23  
Together, these concepts of race, racism, and hegemony scaffold the arenas within 
which ethnically based social movements struggle to obtain their political demands that at 
times include reimagining the state that upholds the hegemonic arrangement. The result is 
 
21 Gary Peller, “Race Consciousness,” in Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the 
Movement, eds. Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. (New York: The New Press, 1995): 128. 
22 Peller, 128. 
23 Ibram X. Kendi, Stamped from the Beginning: The Definitive History of Racist Ideas in America 
(New York: Bold Type Books, 2016), 2–5. 
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an intersectional hegemonic system that ascribes political, economic, and social roles to 
racial stereotypes and operationalizes them into a hierarchized society that posits one 
dominant group above all the others making their interests central while peripheralizing 
others.24 In this arena, for example, whiteness is conflated with political leadership, 
economic affluence, and the idealized social identity where in Latin America this meant 
being a Hispanicized Christian endowed with individual rights that are all reinforced 
through the organs of the state and the laws.25 Consequently, the indigenous and other 
minority populations were subservient and depending on the regime needed to be 
segregated within the confines of circumscribed citizenship or erased through assimilation 
into the dominant national culture with either one being reinforced and instituted by the 
state and those who ruled it. Altogether, this is what this thesis means by hegemonic system 
which is the combined multi-level, multi-scale, and multi-domain dominance by one group 
and the structures it creates to safeguard that dominance either persuasively or coercively 
along racialized socio-political-economic lines. 
At the heart of race and racism is the distorted societal need to establish bounded 
identities and its associated roles and hierarchies. The relevancy to this study comes 
through how certain schools of thoughts would grapple with the concepts of ethnic 
movements and parties. For example, on the one hand there are primordialist that maintain 
that identity is fixed at birth, ascriptive, and that it remains so for the rest of an individual’s 
life or that it is very difficult to cast aside when society has identified an individual in a 
certain way.26 Following this school, one would surmise that ethnically based movements 
or parties would be by their very nature exclusivist precluding them from forming political 
 
24 Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
Against Women of Color,” in Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the Movement, eds. 
Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. (New York: The New Press, 1995), 358–60 
25 Arturo Taracena Arriola, “From Assimilation to Segregation: Guatemala 1800–1944,” in Histories 
of Race and Racism: The Andes and Mesoamerica from Colonial Times to the Present, ed. Laura 
Gotkowitz (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 96–98.  
26 Siniša Malešević, Identity as Ideology: Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism, 1st ed. (London: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2006): 19; Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1986): 12. See other authors such as: Clifford Geertz, “Primordial Ties,” and Steven Grosby, 
“The Inexpungable Tie of Primordiality,” in Ethnicity, eds. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 3rd ed. (New 
York: Basic Books, 2017), 261–68. 
9 
alliances or attracting voters from other groupings thus limiting their success. On the other 
hand, constructivist argue that identity is fluid across spacetime and can either be activated 
by key actors or socio-political structures to become the organizing principal of a given 
movement.27 Under this view, ethnic movements and their political instruments are not 
exclusivist by their nature but constructed and adaptable identities that can coexist with 
others making these organizations capable of being programmatically appealing to outside 
groups and potentially defusing any conflicts based on identity.28 In this study, the 
constructivist path will be followed for it is the dominant school of thought that prevails 
today and also the one that provides the greater explanatory power and variety of theories 
to study indigenous politics across Latin America. 
2. Explaining Indigenous Movements’ Outcomes 
Existing studies on indigenous movements in Latin America, and other regions, 
offer differing explanations for why some of these movements have successfully 
transformed the hegemonic structure while others have failed despite similar endeavors. A 
number of these studies are based on the shifting of citizenship regimes that exist in a given 
country case and how these regimes make indigenous identities salient to political 
discourse and mobilization. This idea posits that as old Cold War–era corporatist regimes 
and their syndical structures faded, the next reducible level of identity, ethnicity, is then 
made more salient for political mobilization which for example may explain why there are 
less labor-centered movements than indigenous based ones.29 The extension of its logic is 
not that indigenous peoples have not rallied around their ethnicities in the past but that they 
did not do so to pursue indigenous agendas.30 In short, institutions matter and variation is 
explained by how deeply can the state penetrate its society and project across a territory; 
 
27 See: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (New York: Verso, 2016); Alberto Melucci, Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and 
Individual Needs in Contemporary Society, eds. John Keane and Paull Miller (London: Century Hutchinson 
Ltd., 1989).  
28 Madrid, The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America, 16–17. 
29 Deborah J. Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements 
and the Postliberal Challenge (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 4–5. 
30 Yashar, 5. 
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where the state is strongest it fosters an imposed shared civic identity where it is weak less 
reducible identities flourish.31 
Others have proposed that indigenous movements will mobilize and only succeed 
if the state undergoes multiple crises that highlight the constraints of its constitutional order 
convincing the elites of the need to enact radical reforms in order to ensure the stability of 
the state.32 For example, an indigenous movements is most likely to obtain an expansion 
of rights and freedoms if it pursues them under the aegis of a burgeoning constitutional 
crisis therefore it maneuvers to ally itself with key elite groups in order to secure its political 
demands.33 Variation is explained by the relative severity of the constitutional crisis 
because elites must believe that the state is no longer viable and that their interests are 
threatened by this and if not the political space will remain closed to reformers.34 Another 
factor within this theory is the length and effectiveness of the constitutional redesign itself 
for if it takes too long or becomes a protracted political fight the less likely constitutional 
reformers are to succeed.35 Finally, aside from the first two factors if the implementation 
of reforms is ineffective then the constitutional drive becomes a pyrrhic victory where 
reforms are enacted but in the absence of enabling legislation to operationalize them thus 
denying the rights to an indigenous community.36 
Yet others suppose that the indigenous movements arose and succeeded because 
their political instruments, i.e., parties, became explicitly non-ethnic even though they had 
origins in ethnically based movements and thus they were able to appeal to other classes 
or groups in building their coalitions.37 In this scenario, the success of indigenous 
movements via indigenous-linked or allied parties hinges upon the degree to which its 
political programming is inclusively populist and how effectively its appeals across ethnic 
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34 Van Cott, 27. 
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36 Van Cott, 34. 
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boundaries.38 The interplay between the degree of populism, intra versus inter-ethnic 
appeals, and the degree of fluidity in ethnic and other identities within a polity, according 
to this theory, can produce a variety of results. If a party is too ethnically exclusionist it 
may not be able to build a winning coalition and vice-versa. 
These theories have tended to overlook the base self-conceptualizations of the 
movements’ members and leaders in terms of how they fundamentally defined themselves 
ethnically or in some other social category. The shortcomings of these approaches in not 
being able to conceive the importance of socially-based identities—gender, issue driven, 
or ethnically based—were addressed by another collection of scholars who saw these 
cleavages as the fundamental drivers of change.39 This new and more constructivist 
approach saw how these social identities posed significant challenges to the preconceived 
notions that were baked into state institutions and that could possibly end in their 
fundamental remaking. This meant that movements that based themselves in near-
irreducible political identities—such as race or gender, for example—had the capacity to 
not only question the privileges of the elites but also challenge the underlying prerogatives 
of them being elites because of who they were.40 
3. Hypothesis 
This thesis attempts to provide a partial answer from one perspective by analyzing 
the two cases of Guatemala and Bolivia. Within the context of wider repression against 
indigenous communities across Latin America, these two cases simultaneously represent 
the shared experiences of the indigenous peoples and the uniqueness of their circumstances. 
This thesis aims to parse out those ideas and concepts that can be regionally and globally 
generalized to other ethnically based politics and highlight the uniquely insightful aspects 
of their similar but divergent developments. It is important to emphasize that this is merely 
one study, one perspective, and one author’s take on what are centuries-old movements 
 
38 Madrid, The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America, 18–19. 
39 Kathryn Hochstetler, “Social Movements in Latin America,” in Routledge Handbook of Latin 
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and struggles for indigenous peoples to be accepted on equal footing with their fellow 
citizens. 
Therefore, with a focus on how indigenous movements achieve constitutional 
change in the pursuit of hegemonic rearrangements, this thesis proposes that only when an 
indigenous movement is unified and seen as representative of the majority of the 
indigenous population, programmatically inclusive, and is well networked and allied with 
other meaningfully powerful actors that it can achieve constitutionalized rights and 
freedoms. For the purposes of this study, the dependent variable is the constitutionalization 
of indigenous rights and protections while the independent variables are the mobilization 
of an indigenous movement, unification of indigenous actors and organizations, and its 
ability to network with other political actors. In one variation, if a given indigenous 
movement has not unified the traditional indigenous political classes with its corresponding 
intellectual elites and together these have not resonated with the larger indigenous 
population the movement should be expected to fail even if it is considered inclusive of 
other groups and well-connected. The result is self-identified indigenous reformers seeking 
constitutional protections through other means such as non-ethnic parties or international 
aid in pressuring the ruling regime, both uncertain prospects. However, if a movement is 
unified but present an exclusionary agenda this may turn off support from other ethnic and 
non-ethnically based groups that could with their resources and organization have 
buttressed the indigenous movement. If a given movement becomes exclusionary to any 
other classes or groups it is expected to be relegated to the political fringes. Likewise, if a 
movement is unified and inclusionary but lacks meaningful political alliances it is expected 
to not gain much traction as the core hegemonic group will activate the entirety of its 
resources to thwart the reformist campaign. 
4. Research Design  
The evidentiary needs of this thought experiment will require an examination of the 
historical development of the contours of the hegemonic system within each of the chosen 
cases. This will be based on written histories, both modern and contemporary, political 
studies of certain time periods, election results, the programs of ethnic and non-ethnic 
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political parties, and other primary sources from significant ethnic and non-ethnic leaders. 
The choice of Guatemala and Bolivia, as recounted at the beginning of this chapter, stems 
from their rough historical similarities. Great weight is also given to their demographic 
resemblances by virtue of their respective indigenous populations being among the largest 
proportional ones in Latin America. The movements themselves, as well as the core-
hegemonic counterparts, will be examined through their political programmatic materials, 
print interviews, and contemporary news coverage. Similarly, the respective referendums, 
constituent assemblies, and outcomes will be examined with similar sources while also 
consulting the applicable constitutions at the time, the actual contents of the ballot, the 
agreed upon election rules and formatting, the deployment of electoral infrastructure, and 
the political agreements between key players among other sources. With the premise for 
this study established, its standard terms defined, theoretical review outlined, and a theory 
put forward this thesis now moves into an overview of its structure.  
5. Overview and Chapter  
After this introductory chapter’s outlining of theoretical foundations, this study will 
tackle each case within its own chapter which are similarly designed. In these empirical 
chapters, the historical development and modern outlines of each country’s hegemonic 
system identifying the hegemonic core group along with those considered peripheral will 
be explored. Then the chapter shall isolate the respective indigenous movement and 
examine its constituent parts of how it arose, its intellectual lineages, key leaders and 
figures, and the role they played in the constitutionalizing moment as far as formulating 
political demands and participating in the process. This is followed by a similar analysis of 
the hegemonic counteraction as mounted by the core group, i.e., the elites and their allies, 
in defending the status quo hegemonic arrangements. An analysis of their demands, 
strategies, and responses to their hegemonic challengers will follow a similar pattern to that 
given to the indigenous movements.  
The conclusion takes a unifying comparative view of Guatemala and Bolivia, 
synthesizing from the highlights of the empirical chapters a condensed view of the key 
differences and generalizations between the two cases. Then the chapter will summarize 
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the findings and provide concluding thoughts. Part of these thoughts is the hope that this 
study has provided the reader with an appreciation of how race matters not only in Latin 
American politics but in politics in general and how the twin pillars of nationalism and 
homogenization of national identity buttressed systems of indigenous and minority 
marginalization and oppression.41  
 
41 Deborah J. Yashar, “Does Race Matter in Latin America? How Racial and Ethnic Identities Shape 
the Region’s Politics,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 94, no. 2 (March-April, 2015): 1–7.  
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II. GUATEMALA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, Guatemala held a referendum on affirming or rejecting the terms written 
by a peace process between the central government and the guerrillas of the Guatemalan 
National Revolutionary Union—hereon known by its Spanish acronym, URNG—that 
sought to end ethnic and class tensions that had been violently raging since 1960.42 Rather 
than delivering the long-sought after epochal change that would herald equality and bridge 
the largest ethnic divide within the country, that between the Mayas and ladinos—
unexclusive descendants of the Spanish colonists—it instead delivered a disheartening 
blow to a conflict that has been unresolved since 1821. The principal failure laid with the 
rejection of Guatemalan plurinationalism along with measures to widen and deepen the 
framework of citizenship. This cathartic event punctuated more than fifty-five years of 
targeted violence against the Mayan population by the core ladino group that dominates 
the Guatemalan hegemonic system.43  
Regionally, Latin America has only experienced a handful of ethno-national 
referendums and most notably, due to the high proportion of the indigenous population, 
this failure is telling in how the hegemonic dynamics within Guatemala forged the outcome 
of the civil war. This outcome is still evolving at this moment and permeates all throughout 
Guatemalan politics making it an excellent example for exploring variation in autonomic 
pursuits, especially when a similar nation with a similar demographic makeup, namely 
Bolivia, experiences a starkly different result.  
Therefore, this chapter reflects on the historical development of the Guatemalan 
polity, outlines its currents and patterns, and then juxtaposes the hypothesis onto it seeking 
to explain the outcome of this referendum which by proxy represents the current state of 
 
42 Comisión para el Esclaracimiento Histórico [Commission for Historical Clarification; CEH] 
Guatemala: Memory of Silence / Tz’inil Na’Tab’al: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification, 
Conclusions, and Recommendations, 12 vols. (Guatemala: CEH, 1999). https://hrdag.org/wp-content/
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Guatemalan power hierarchies. This paper argues that because the Pan-Mayan movement 
was not fully unified, not perceived as a pluralistic movement, and that its coalition 
building was lackluster that it was predispose to fail in reforming the constitutional order 
within Guatemala and therefore dislodging the ladinos from their privileged positions 
within the nation. 
1. Historical Patterns of the Guatemalan Hegemonic System 
The nineteenth-century was characterized by struggles over individual and property 
rights as well as the shape of the national identity that would frame the political-economic 
nature of the nation-state.44 Among the strongest legacies left behind by imperial Spain 
are the racial hierarchies, these posited political-economic power hereditarily and ordered 
society from black, to Indian, to ladino, to white and locked in the stereotypes that socially 
framed each group.45 Simultaneously, the elite factions that shaped racial discourse, 
largely European-descendant creoles, argued that ladinos, mestizos of partly European and 
Indian descent, were merely reconfigured Indians and resultantly encouraged liberalism-
based assimilation to unite all Guatemalans under one identity.46 The liberal view that 
dominated the first phase of identity construction in Guatemala subsequently took 
inspiration from the French and American revolutions and wider enlightenment discourses 
on the nature of citizenship based on individual rights and service to the nation.47 These 
are the lenses through which the creole elites viewed the ladinos and more so the 
indigenous as obstacles to the formation of a cohesive, liberal nation where the Spanish 
language, individual rights, Catholicism, private property ownership, and overall European 
culture were the standards they needed to meet.48 Without these identity pillars, they 
 
44 Kim D. Butler and Aline Helg, “Race in Postabolition Afro-Latin America,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Latin American History, ed. Jose C. Moya (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), 258.  
45 Carol A. Smith, “Introduction: Social Relations in Guatemala over Time and Space,” in 
Guatemalan Indians and the State 1540–1988, ed. Carol A. Smith, asst.ed. Marilyn M. Moors (Austin, TX: 
University of Texas Press, 1992), 4.  
46 Smith, “Introduction,” 4.  
47 Arturo Taracena Arriola, “From Assimilation to Segregation: Guatemala 1800–1944,” in Histories 
of Race and Racism: The Andes and Mesoamerica from Colonial Times to the Present, ed. Laura 
Gotkowitz (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 96-97.  
48 Taracena Arriola, 97.  
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reasoned that a nation could not be truly united so long as most of its citizenry remained 
outside the purview of European culture thus uncivilized.  
Under this guise, an odd pairing took place as the nineteenth-century progressed 
and citizenship debates became polarized along the lines of conservatives represented the 
adaptation of colonially segregationist norms and liberals stood for assimilationist 
republicanism. Continuing older colonial practices, but now under republican trappings, 
the conservatives sought to preserve the subordinated roles of each racial group and the 
segregated political-economic spheres that characterized them.49 These went so far as to 
promote multilingualism, separate political-judicial administrations, communal titled land 
ownership, and the reinstatement of indigenous political leadership over these lands.50 
However, these notions were predicated on a paternalistic view of the indigenous 
populations as different in their learning abilities, needing to be compelled to work, and 
obligated to provide “public service”51 while being territorially segregated onto their 
ancestral lands.52 In many ways, more so for the creole elites than for the indigenous, these 
policies represented the conservative reinstitution of older colonial policies and practices 
that were seen to guarantee socio-economic stability in contrast with the chaos of 
liberalism.53 In short, conservatives offered paternalistic protections that ensured the 
segregated and curtailed continuity of indigenous identity within a differentiated 
Guatemala whereas as we shall see the liberals offered an egalitarian framework of 
citizenship but that underwrote exploitation.54  
Under the liberals, Guatemalan Indians experienced the inverse where theoretically 
they were granted equality before the law and individually could access more diverse and 
 
49 Taracena Arriola, “From Assimilation to Segregation," 98-99. 
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larger quantities of land throughout Guatemala versus under their old communal ways.55 
However, liberalism also economically chartered the path towards capitalistic exploitation 
with no economic support or protections from a state whose main preoccupation was the 
growth and development of Guatemala through agricultural exports and maintaining 
conducive economic conditions.56 In the subject of capitalism, the liberals saw the state as 
an agent that would aid private capital in developing the land in ways that could be taxed 
by the central government to raise much needed revenues, however, because of weak 
governmental structures this did not come to fruition.57 This made the incipient liberal 
government vulnerable to popular discontent and revolt, where the last materialized itself 
by the late 1830s resulting in the toppling of the liberal experiment and establishment of 
the conservative dictatorship.58  
One way to observe the emerging political-economic is through the manner in 
which the two camps coalesced around their perspective ideas of racial hierarchies and 
corresponding roles and privileges in terms of land ownership. As mentioned before, the 
liberals saw the dual political-economical role of the state as one that guarantees egalitarian 
rights from its citizenry while simultaneously developing the capitalistic agents of growth 
that would help steady it. With their return in 1871, the liberal reformers restarted their 
attempts at “modernizing” Guatemala through agricultural development with the prime 
obstacles being indigenous communal lands.59 This required racially-charged bureaucratic 
maneuvers that first administratively whitened the indigenous population through their 
reclassification as ladinos whilst creating a registry for titled properties which did not 
recognize collective ownership.60 This dual-faceted strategy yielded considerable amounts 
of lands that the government then granted to richer, whiter groups who had access to 
international financing and trade markets while now individualized Indians were bereft of 
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the main form of capital in an agrarian economy. Coupled with the under-resourced and 
under-education levels of the indigenous populations, most did not have the ability to 
leverage the legal system to defend their rights.61 The end result was the mass-
dispossession of entire Mayan communities without any forms of state assistance in aiding 
their collateral integration into wider Guatemalan politics and society.  
As seen thus far, the contentious debates around citizenship and identity as they 
relate to the construction of a nation and a state have roughly condensed around the lines 
of racial differentiation, segregation, and the overriding need to develop the Guatemalan 
economy. These political-economic phenomena have now set the outlines that would 
heavily guide Guatemalan national discourse well into the twentieth-century. These 
identity projects would come to haunt the Pan-Mayan movement in the 1990s as they 
pushed for a reimagining of the Guatemalan state and among the obstacles were timeless 
features of the Guatemalan political landscape such as racism, concentration of wealth and 
power, and institutional biases against racial minorities.  
1. The Guatemalan Civil War: 1960–1996 
At its conclusion, the Guatemalan civil war had claimed the lives of over 200,000 
people as a result of various military campaigns during which approximately 93% of 
human rights violations were committed by the military, mostly against the Mayas.62 The 
ensuing United Nations truth commission had concluded that the political-economic 
structures of Guatemala, alongside the marginalization of the indigenous communities, had 
resulted in a racist campaign to protect the elite minorities and their privileges.63 These 
findings, published in 1999, attest to the continuity of the same racialized repressive norms 
and strategies that the creole elites had deployed against the very same Mayan communities 
little over a century before. In this section, as illustrated thus far, shall explore how the 
racialized political-economic conflicts of the nineteenth-century survived into the 
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twentieth-century with devastating repercussions for both the safety, survival, and 
continuity of the Guatemalan identity building project.  
At the root of this conflict, we can observe the ossification of the nineteenth-century 
foundations where in the run up to the war, the peasantry, who were largely Mayan, had 
been confined to precariously shrinking pieces of communal land that were slowly 
degrading because of intensive agriculture.64 Simultaneously, an alternative arrangement 
had revamped the paternalistic networks that nineteenth-century conservatives had revived 
from Spanish times where portions of the now-peasantry lived on lands owned by a wealthy 
ladino class without any labor or economic rights.65 Essentially, the Mayan labor 
population had been reduced to peonage with a dependent relationship established between 
laborers and the patrón who owned various haciendas that were not necessarily located 
among the Mayan communities, causing laborers to travel to other parts of Guatemala. At 
the same time, the indigenous communities, much like their forebears, had been shut out 
from credit and financing networks that favored doing business with larger scale farms as 
both were dominated by the ladino elite who were tied to international markets.66  
This time period was also characterized by the collusion among the largely elite 
ladinos to capitalize on the underdevelopment of the indigenous communities via wage 
depression, eliminating labor competition, and the often-violent enforcement of written 
contracts although most Mayan workers were largely illiterate.67 These political-economic 
pressures and repression of the Mayas precluded them from being accepted and were 
widely excluded by the ladino minorities from the identity building projects of Guatemala. 
Moreover, they represented the dichotomous challenges that the ladino elites never 
overcame, the dual-track strategy of ladinization and or elimination of the Mayas as the 
backward elements in a modernizing nation.  
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This ever-present struggle, the perceived ladino necessity to turn the Maya into 
something other than what they were while also preserving their ladinized political-
economic privileges defined the Guatemalan civil war.68 Ladino politics cannot be 
disassociated from their economic structures, norms, and strategies for they represented the 
othering of the indigenous communities and the continuation of the historical struggles 
between the two groups. In the 1970s, the same nineteenth-century acculturation processes 
were still regarded by the ladino elites, who went to lengths to prove their whiteness, as 
central to their acceptance of the Mayans into the national project.69 This mentality, 
pervasive among the elites as much as it was among the military leadership, precipitated 
an atmosphere conducive towards the genocidal elimination of entire Mayan communities 
as witnessed in the 1982 massacres that took the lives of over 2,000 men, women, and 
children.70 
Against these backdrops are power consolidation, systemic bias against minorities, 
and the targeted military campaigns against Mayan communities which all laid bare the 
inherent design of the hegemonic arrangements within Guatemala and framed the 
challenges that the emergent Pan-Mayan movement would have in obtaining their 
demands. It was in the aftermath of these events, along with the wider regional pivot 
towards the deployment of neoliberal political-economic reforms, that the Pan-Mayan 
movement began maturing and expanding bridging a number of divides among the diverse 
array of Mayan communities. This is so because even though the preponderance of the 
violence highlighted the seeming timeless tensions between the core ladino hegemonic 
group and the peripheral Mayan communities, racism is Guatemala, like many other 
countries, did not function dichotomously or with precision. 
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2. Mayan Mobilization and Racism in Guatemala 
In order to understand the peace process of the 1990s, we must first divest ourselves 
of homogenizing the Mayan peoples as a monolithically united bloc and instead embrace 
that they are comprised of a variety of fluidly multilingual communities with distinct 
regionalist tendencies. At the same time, we must contextualize and appraise ourselves 
with the equally fluid dynamics of Guatemalan racism and how it influenced, warped, and 
outlined current Guatemalan society as anchored in the geospatial experiences of the 
national events aforementioned in previous sections. Together, these two brief forays will 
help us understand how the peace process came to be and serve as contextually 
summarizing points that aid in transitioning away from civil war to the contemporary era 
of Guatemalan national politics.  
Understanding current Mayan internal diversity is critical to understanding the 
development of the Pan-Mayanist movement and the competition for the lead position of 
their struggle against the racist and delimiting hegemonic dynamics of Guatemala. The 
Maya themselves make up approximately ninety-percent of the indigenous population of 
Guatemala, with the eastern Xinca and coastal Garifuna rounding out the remainder, and it 
is constituted by over twenty-two distinct groups who preponderantly speak four major 
inter-related languages.71 These languages—K’ichee’, Mam, Kaqchikel, and Q’eqchii’—
comprise the largest communities in over 190 municipalities across Guatemala which cover 
or surround some of the largest metro areas of the country such as Guatemala City, 
Quetzaltenango, and Huehuetenango.72  
The Mayan power to forge a unified front and project a common identity is further 
constrained by the fluid dynamics of race and racism in Guatemala. With varied categories 
of Euro-Guatemalan, creole, ladino, mistado, cholo, and Indian, Guatemalan racialization 
and racism varies in degrees and was based on descendance as well as outward cultural 
expression and social prowess which itself as a whole was ranked-compared with other 
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identities along a political-economic ladder. Today’s ladinos, descendants of Spanish and 
other European immigrants that have intertwined with the indigenous population, occupy 
the higher rungs of Guatemalan society. As a group, they have historically monopolized 
political, economic, and socio-cultural power to the degree that over time they came to 
define the outlines of Guatemalan nationalism, citizenship, and the character of the nation-
state.73 Because of these historical privileges, the ladinos became the baseline for how to 
conceptualize Guatemalan-ness and therefore also define what constituted the ideas around 
the concept of ‘passing off’ between the different racialized categories.  
As mentioned, a significant number of ladinos across Guatemalan history also 
intermingled with Mayan communities which gave rise to alternative identities such as 
mistados and cholos who find themselves straddling the boundaries between the two major 
groups. Collectively, and to varying degrees, they spectrally adopt and reject facets of 
indigenous culture as well as notions of ladino-ness presenting a challenge to the 
historically constructed bipolarity of racial relations.74 The mistados posed a challenge to 
indigenous mobilization because unlike its resemblance to the term mestizo, found in other 
Latin American countries, in Guatemala it did not imply a distillation of two culture; 
instead it was a phenomenon where someone would self-conceptualize themselves with the 
identity of one parent or the other.75 This racial category was heavily tied to the 
individual’s ability to socially, economically, and or politically transcend—i.e., pass off 
as—their perceived phenotypical identity and thus allowed a ladino or indigenous person 
with a transcendental phenotype to become either or of those identities.  
Another racial category found in Guatemala is that of the cholo, who, unlike the 
mistados, culturally and liberally borrow from two dominant groups, ladinos and Mayas, 
and distill a unique syncretic identity within the Guatemalan racial hierarchy. And while 
ladinos may view them as being poor cultural mimes while the Mayas see them as alienated 
73 Taracena Arriola, “From Assimilation to Segregation,” 100–3. 
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members of the urban indigenous communities, ethnographically they represent an 
intermingling of both communities that challenge the policed permeability of both 
identities.76 These two racialized categories pose assimilationist challenges to the borders 
and definition of indigenous identities insomuch that, from a ladino perspective, throw into 
question as to who should receive special rights and recognition. The differences that the 
Pan-Mayan movement had to overcome internally and peripherally at their racialized 
boundaries serve as reminders of how fluid identities can be and how these dynamics can 
affect the political-economic power of a group and in turn influence its ability to organize 
and present their demands in a united fashion. 
Guatemalan racism distilled itself politically, economically, and culturally in such 
fashion that it laid the foundations for the hegemonic order within the country and imbued 
the state with its character and norms. As in other Latin American countries, but more so 
pronounced in Guatemala, neoliberalism reinforced the historical patterns of 
discrimination and social ranking with these shaping the now de-regulated economy.77 As 
the ladino elites purchased and concentrated their land holdings, these destabilized the 
Mayan rural workers who would till their milpas and seasonally labor on large plantations 
and instead they would move onto estates and be compensated through sharecropping.78  
Because it is not only economic strength that imbues an ethnic group with 
hegemonic power but rather the sum of its dominance of political-economic and socio-
cultural dialectically tense struggles that together mold and realize its hegemonic abilities 
within the confines of the nation state.79 In this regard, the ladino minority enormously 
benefitted from the adaptive legacy of their colonial roots in regards to historical property 
ownership, legacy economic networks, and a state apparatus that had institutionalized 
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ladino-centered culture and discourse. Eventually, the accords themselves, although 
containing a number of economic items, in sum represented a challenge to this historical 
multi-sectoral dominance of the ladino communities by potentially equalizing Mayan 
languages, cultural practices, political ideas, and resource ownership with those of the 
dominant ladino class. In this light, many opposition figures fostered fear over the failure 
to defend their position as the bearers of modern westernized Hispanic culture with its 
connotations of a Samuel Huntington–like clash of civilization with the hegemonic 
minority center being displaced and overtaken by the demographically superior 
periphery.80  
B. THE INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT 
Along with the intricacies and perils of Guatemalan racialization and racism, the 
peace process also highlighted the limits of the Pan-Mayan movement’s ability to effect 
change which foreshadowed their performance during the 1999 referendum. Here, this 
project turns to the formation and composition of the movement as it emerged from the 
Guatemalan civil war and became a key player in the ensuing peace process.  
In 1978, following a series of protests that trekked along the Pan-American 
Highway and involved over 150,000 people, mostly indigenous, rocked Guatemalan 
politics in what became one of the largest mass-demonstration of indigenous dissent since 
the 1950s. In May of that year, the various grass-movements coalesced into the United 
Peasant’s Committee (CUC) which became the first indigenous-led civil organization with 
the explicit purpose of pressing for social justice.81 However, as the civil war grinded on 
into the 1980s it became an increasingly militant movement whose character was uniquely 
Mayan and ethnically based in contrast with the leftist insurgency’s class-based struggle.82 
The CUC eventually integrated most of its members in the Guerrilla Army of the Poor 
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(EGP) which in 1982 became part of the URNG.83 In the mid to late nineteen-eighties, the 
URNG was experiencing a halting resurgence where they had achieved a chaotic stasis vis-
á-vis the Guatemalan military which influenced their turn towards establishing their 
political power rather than militarily capturing the state.84 Out of this stasis, came the first 
peace talks between the warring parties and a rapprochement between the URNG and CUC. 
Once the war wound down, and the elections of 1990 took place, the parties began 
a series of negotiations that included the URNG, CACIF,85 the state, and international third 
parties which haltingly progressed into the mid-nineties until the Serranazo, and auto-coup 
by President Jorge Serrano. In 1994, the Serranazo brought together over 150 indigenous 
organizations under the aegis of the Coalition of Organizations of the Maya People of 
Guatemala (COPMAGUA) with the purpose of presenting Pan-Mayan demands during the 
peace process in loose conjunction with the URNG, which was made up of ex-civil war 
Marxist combatants. The friction between the two organizations lay in their fundamental 
perceptions of what ailed Guatemalan society with COPMAGUA having an ethnically 
based understanding of Guatemalan violence, discrimination, and inequality whereas the 
URNG saw class-based oppression that was in line with their Marxist lineage.86  
As far as the development of a recognizable, coordinated, and self-identified 
indigenous movement; this came in the form of the dozens of member organizations within 
COPMAGUA. Their alliance with the URNG and their collective participation as one front 
within the peace process signaled the changing dynamics within Guatemala at the time. 
Arguably, this was the first time since the nineteenth-century that there was a sizable and 
politically mobilized indigenous movement that could rival other political centers within 
the Guatemalan establishment and exercise hegemonic maneuvering vis-á-vis the core 
group of ladino elites. On another historical front, because of their alliance with the URNG, 
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COPMAGUA was also able to extend and to some extent present their demands across 
racial lines to include poorer ladinos.  
However, one must ask whether this movement was largely unified, accepted, and 
representative of the Mayan peoples. On the one hand, intellectuals like Demetrio Cojtí 
were accepted as the philosophical founders of the principles that propelled the Pan-Mayan 
movement.87 As the talks progressed, various high-profile actors within the movement 
came to be seen as either not radical or authentic enough to be seen as serious Mayan 
leaders often having accusations of selling out being leveled against them.88 The 
movement itself continued its ideological struggle with more traditional leftist groups 
within the URNG and in the international sphere that stressed more class-based economic 
and individual rights discourses.89 Ironically, these leftist movements themselves 
continued the assimilationist thought that had tainted government discourse since national 
independence in the nineteenth-century. Although these movements would share the 
language of autonomy, self-determination, and exploitation they did so purely on terms 
that universalized and watered down the unique experiences of indigenous peoples for the 
sake of maintaining support with international partners who campaigned on liberal 
universal rights that did not necessarily rhyme with ethnically based struggles.90  
There were also divisions among the activists, some who saw the demands of the 
Mayanist movement as not enough, others seeing them as racist against poor ladinos, and 
yet others saw them are illegitimate. One key group of Mayan leaders that the movement 
was unable to decisively integrate into their ranks, both organizationally and discursively, 
were the traditional municipal-level formal leaders of the hundreds of Mayan communities 
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throughout Guatemala.91 These leaders, unlike many others, embodied the very indigenous 
values and structures that the movement sought recognition for and puzzling enough was 
unable to fully yield their support. These municipales, whose careers and styles were 
deeply emmeshed with their respective villages and at times seen as the embodiment of the 
town’s will, were the basis of traditional local government that framed Mayan practices 
and leadership.92 Representing over fifty-percent of the Mayan population across over one-
hundred-sixty municipalities, these principales would have been key to the referendum’s, 
and the Pan-Mayan movement’s, success and yet they largely chose to steer clear of 
national politics.93  
To these leaders at the municipal level, the movement threatened to transfer their 
authorities and autonomy away from the cantons or municipalities up to the national 
government thus diluting traditional Mayan political leadership.94 Additionally, activist 
and movement leaders were seen as disconnected urbanites who had little concerns over 
and knowledge of municipal-level issues and thus were seen as internationally-backed 
interventionists.95 Most Mayanist taking part in the movement were middle class, urban, 
educated, and have been characterized as close to passing-off as ladinos which fueled their 
differentiation from rural Mayan populations who govern themselves under traditional 
municipal arrangements.96  
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The overall perspective on the Pan-Mayan movement is one of a strong, Mayan-led 
and defined political mobilization born out of civil war that was able to ally itself with a 
potent military-political force in the form of the URNG. However, this gave way to the 
historical disagreements between the indigenous movement and the leftist guerrillas who 
framed Guatemala’s national challenges differently where the former was based on the 
realities of racism the latter saw capitalism as the ultimate oppressor. Considering the 
strength and intellectual depth of the Pan-Mayan movement, and its active shaping of 
demands throughout the peace accords, it was poised to become a central force in 
Guatemalan politics. However, the ideological divisions within the COPMAGUA-URNG 
alliance coupled with those within the Pan-Mayan movement stunted their reach and 
growth into the depths of Mayan communities.  
The Pan-Mayan movement was seen as an internationally-backed urbanite 
intellectual movement that did not recruit or heavily jockey with local municipal and 
traditional leaders and thus were also seen as disconnected from the rural lives of the 
majority of the Mayan peoples. All of these factors made the Pan-Mayan movement a risky 
but attractive actor with whom the state elites and the URNG could work with in order to 
draft the peace accords and be able to say that they received Mayan inputs but that was 
hobbled in its ability to deliver results. In another way that the movement was not entirely 
united behind its alliance with the URNG, there were those who doubted that racism and 
uniquely indigenous problems would be a resolved by a ladino-dominated revolutionary 
front.97 However, the Pan-Mayan movement’s alliance with the URNG and other leftist 
elements in Guatemala was bounded by the sheer enormity and intensity of state-
sanctioned violence directed against Mayan communities and besides the significant 
reservations many Mayan activists had with the left these were quickly but not ideally 
forgotten in the face of a common enemy.98 
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C. THE HEGEMONIC COUNTER-REACTION 
Thus far, this project has briefly swept through Guatemala’s historical patterns of 
hegemony and the hierarchy and relationships of power that it engendered, followed by a 
study of the roots and development of the Pan-Mayan movement, and also a review of its 
effectiveness. But, what about the opposition? How did it come to be and how effective 
was it? That will be the aim of this chapter as it examines the coalescence of various 
powerful interest groups within the ladino majority—namely the state, military, and 
business elites—and juxtaposes their strategies and effectiveness in thwarting the Pan-
Mayan autonomic drive while preserving their core hegemony. Understanding their moves 
precludes understanding the failure of the Mayan movement within the wider political 
context of the time. We must therefore, chart a brief outline of Guatemala’s journey from 
Cold War dictatorship to a neoliberal flawed democracy in order to learn the lineages of 
the main ladino interest groups that were present in the runup to the referendum.99 Once 
their origins are revealed, their interests will be established enabling us to chart their 
strategies in dealing with the Pan-Mayan movement.  
While the Pan-Mayan movement was in its infancy, the Guatemalan polity as led 
by Gen Efraín Ríos Montt had morphed from a corporatist, monocultural exporter state to 
a whole-of-government counterinsurgency apparatus at the command of the army.100 
While ladinos dominated on both sides of the conflict, by enlarge the elites of Guatemala 
self-conceptualized themselves as a white European-descended class who financially, 
politically, and socially dominated the country.101 Politically and economically, the 
business, military, and political elites had become intertwined with each other in 
reinforcing ways where one group monopolized the means of violence, and at times 
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political leadership, while the others focused on resource extraction in order to engage in 
international trade.  
Since 1944, the military had provided nineteen of the twenty-six heads of state 
while simultaneously being perceived as the only enduring political institution in the 
country.102 This developed into an interdependent relationship between the state and 
business elites in developmentalist, exploitative, and institutionalist ways as they 
reactionarily guarded the interests of the wider ladino-dominated elites.103 By the 1980s, 
the military had become the chief arbiter of national identity because its leadership was 
largely comprised of ladino-descended officers who shaped the institution and thus the 
outlines of what it meant to be a citizen.104 
For the economic elites, their legacy was one where ownership over land, means of 
production, and labor were interwoven into one mindset of hierarchical relationships that 
could be racially transcendent in some instances, such as recognizing a fellow political 
leader in a Mayan elder, but often were not and thus shaped their view of Guatemala’s 
social and economic order.105 The systemic, multi-century expropriation of communal 
lands and the extreme concentration of land-ownership meant that during the time of the 
peace accords the elites owned nearly two-thirds of the land while only making up two 
percent of agricultural producers.106 Further concentrations were driven by energy projects 
as well as privatizations of utilities alongside other neoliberal economic reforms that were 
made towards the end of the conflict which further solidified the business elites’ control 
over the Guatemalan economy.107 Their power over the state’s finances, taxing structures, 
and exports was exemplified in 1985 when the government at the time announced a series 
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of tariffs that affected their business networks that resulted in their demand the government 
fire a number of officials connected with that tax project.108 Based on their power and 
influence over the Guatemalan economy, the business elites as represented by the trade 
organization CACIF, were among the groups that the Pan-Mayan movement needed to 
either confront or assuage and that the opposition needed to keep in their sphere. With their 
considerable influence, CACIF possessed the ability to decisively sway the referendum, 
and the following presidential election, towards either camp.  
On the political elites, they consolidated their positions once Gen Ríos Montt was 
deposed by his own defense minister who ushered in democratic elections in 1985 that 
installed President Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo and paved the way for further democratizations 
at the end of the civil war.109 President Cerezo Arévalo was then able to survive various 
coup attempts and pass on the presidency to Jorge Serrano Elías who in 1993 attempted an 
auto-coup in a bid to establish one-man rule which had the effect of uniting the political-
economic, military elites and Pan-Mayan movement against him.110 
The 1995 presidential and congressional elections resulted in the National 
Advancement Party (PAN) and the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) gaining control 
of both the legislature and the presidency which presented procedural hurdles to the Pan-
Mayanist-allied party, New Guatemala Democratic front (FDNG), which needed two-
thirds support.111 With the parties of President-elect Álvaro Arzú and accused war criminal 
Efraín Rios Montt in power, PAN and FRG respectively, they were poised to serve as the 
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counter-reactionary forces against the Pan-Mayanist movement and the URNG. The 
significance of this to the coming referendum in 1999 lies in the potential allies or 
adversaries the Pan-Mayan movement would have to work with. On the one hand, they had 
a potential ally in President Arzú who could persuade undecided PAN conservatives to at 
least not hamper the vote while in the FRG they potentially had the single greatest threat 
to the procedural legitimacy of the constitutionalization drive. With PAN susceptible to 
fracturing between its pro and anti-accords members, it was imperative that the FDNG and 
the Pan-Movement move swiftly to ensure their support before the FRG could begin their 
interference.  
The mandate delivered by voters was splintered between the former military ruler 
Gen Rios Montt, who through his proxy candidate received 48% of the vote, and President-
elect Arzú who received 51% and ran on a platform of continuing democratization in 
tandem with the peace process.112 Under those conditions, it is questionable that President 
Arzú received a decisive mandate from the electorate considering the split between his 
party and that of Gen Rios Montt who received support from some puzzling but key regions 
considering his commanding role in the bloodiest massacres of the civil war that took place 
in them.  
Once inaugurated, President Arzú began a campaign to implement and ratify the 
peace accords signed in 1996 with the sacking of corrupt and criminally suspicious military 
and governmental officials as well as supporting the creation of the congressional 
committees needed to draft the referendum articles.113 Altogether, although it can be 
argued that the election of President Arzú could be in some significant ways interpreted as 
a sign of the broader electorate’s desire to implement the peace accords likewise their 
support of the FRG diluted, if not weakened, this notion which casts doubt on the clarity 
of the national desire. On the one hand, one can observe a president who is willing to bring 
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about constitutional reforms while noting significant programmatic and institutional 
challenges within congress that would water down the perceived popular mandate.  
Altogether, the opposition was fairly united with significant power centers in the 
congressional committees in the form of the FRG, CACIF’s network of over eighty-
thousand businesses and individuals, and a military that still held the URNG-COPMAGUA 
as a direct challenge to their authority. Even within President Arzú’s cabinet there were 
deep divisions between those who wanted to see the peace accords to its conclusion and 
who drifted closer to the FRG’s no-vote position. These divisions are noticeable insomuch 
that they show the extent of support the conservatives enjoy across party-lines and these 
representing bridges through which they create coalitions against a favorable Pan-Mayan 
outcome. Even though Arzú himself is for the accords and had shepherded them his 
government was not wholly unified therefore giving the Pan-Mayan movement one more 
flank to watch and the FRG another avenue for counter-action.  
For example, the entirety of the peace process, from the beginning of congressional 
deliberations, to the ratification of ILO-169, to the political inclusion of the URNG and the 
Pan-Mayanist movement, the signing of the baseline accords, it was President Arzú 
pushing the PAN—and its conservative factions—along while cajoling the FRG to at least 
dampen their innate resistance to peace.114 However, first he was stymied and delayed 
repeatedly by his coalition partners and perennial challengers the FRG. Considering their 
closeness to victory in the last election, and an upcoming election in 1999 shortly after the 
referendum, the FRG transformed itself into a staunch opponent to peace and made it its 
mission to obstruct the PAN and President Arzú’s progress.115 
In this regard, President Arzú being ineligible for reelection severely reduced the 
chances that if successful the referendum would be implemented faithfully, given the 
enormous opposition within his and other powerful parties, and if unsuccessful that the 
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pro-referendum would regroup. This is in addition to his cabinet being divided between 
conservative anti-referendum PAN members and pro-referendum appointees highlighted 
the Achilles heel of his presidential leadership if he were to become unavailable or 
sidelined. Through negotiations between the PAN, FRG, and COPMAGUA the opposition 
elements were able to dilute and mushroom the range of articles that would presented to 
voters which had grown from thirteen provisions to over fifty articles across four 
categories.116  
Among the elites, considering that President Arzú’s support oscillated between 
thirty-three and fifty percent of polls as well as the fact that he became president after a 
runoff one can argue that the overall position of the elites is one of tepid but brittle openness 
to the referendum.117 Consequently, the electorate titillated between supporting the FRG 
and PAN in the runup to the 1995 election which handed the presidency to Arzú but 
legislative power to Gen. Ríos Montt, president of the chamber of deputies, similarly 
dividing the elites. This is because the referendum threatened their hegemonic preeminence 
when it came to property rights, social rights, and economic exclusivity as well as opening 
the door to prosecuting military leaders who committed genocidal crimes protecting elite 
interests. As a result, there’s an elite faction who wants to avoid international sanctions 
against the country and emmesh themselves in the then-emergent trend of globalization 
and another faction made up by the FRG and some members of CACIF who wanted to 
retain control over the apparatus of state and modernize, i.e., eliminate the Mayas.  
A collateral result of the referendum negotiations was also the delay of the vote into 
the spring of 1999 which was a general election year during which everything would 
predictably become politicized.118 To this end, conservatives within the FRG and various 
nationally-allied organizations began a systematic media campaign with columns, 
television pieces, and newspaper articles of which some were written by anti-referendum 
Mayan activist themselves. To this effect, the opposition employed noted Mayan journalist 
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Estuardo Zapeta who passionately argued to ladino audiences that identity was not a 
national question but rather a social and individual one.119  
He furthered his criticism in assimilationist and instrumentalist terms, depicting 
international organizations and Pan-Mayanist as working in tandem to invent Mayan 
languages, benefiting from each other economically, and arguing that there was no basis 
for multiple systems of law within a country.120 Additionally, the opposition carried out a 
campaign of fear that warned against the Balkanization of the country, that traditional 
religious practices would supplant the Christian faith, and that ladino children would be 
forced to learn indigenous culture.121 The conservative factions then resorted to legal 
challenges, where in one case they called into question the layout of the questions 
themselves and other minutia in order to further deaccelerate the process.122 All of this 
was pitted against organizations such as MINUGUA, the European Union thru the 
Coordinating Committee of Europeans, and the United States who as a whole funded 
various radio, newspaper, and television pieces in attempts to rally support behind the Yes 
vote.123 
As far as the CACIF and the business elites it represents, initially it was in favor of 
the peace accords and the referendum as they seemingly promised an end to three decades 
of continual political violence and thus stability for the commercial sector.124 However, as 
the constitutional process encountered delays in congress CACIF’s support eroded and 
finally caved when dozens of amendments were made, having increased from a dozen to 
fifty, which gave the impression that control over the process had been lost.125 Because of 
its international portfolios and its business-friendly initiatives, although CACIF was 
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cautious about abandoning the Yes camp because it would ultimately run afoul of the vested 
international players it nonetheless found its way to reassert its majoritarian-ladino 
identity.126 Although CACIF was not one of the active litigants against the constitutional 
reforms or vociferously against the idea of a referendum it nevertheless chose the 
conservative option of supporting certain continuities of the status quo. Days before the 
national vote, it revoked its support for the referendum and allowed a cascade of No add-
campaigns that warned Guatemalans of the country’s coming Balkanization, the 
confiscation of private property, the imposition of indigenous law, and the overthrow of 
Hispanic culture.127 
As for the Guatemalan military, although it was the initiator of democratization in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s its institutional momentum was still towards maintaining a 
weakened democratic system where military power would ensure influence over the 
political state.128 And although the military repeatedly safeguarded the transition to 
democracy, it would ultimately negotiate various privileges for itself in order to maintain 
its primacy over politics and civil society as the ultimate guarantor of Guatemalan identity 
and political order.129 It also avoided complete demobilization or the reformation of its 
officer ranks, an issue of note because of the corps’ near-total composition of ladinos which 
influence the military’s doctrine of indigenous subjugation which was in addition to its 
maintenance of the notorious civil defense patrol units.130 These civil defense units were 
one of the main forms of oppression against the indigenous population during the era of 
the counterinsurgency state and the military was able to lobby for their compensation.131 
In addition to that lobbying, because the military had accepted the premise of reforming 
the Guatemalan state it effectively shielded itself from further reforms to its own privileges 
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as civilian authorities lacked the executive direction to shape their relationship with the 
generals.132 As a result, the military was able to eliminate the two provisions from the 
referendum that most threatened its domestic preeminence; that which limited their 
freedom to operate authoritatively within Guatemala and the call for a civilian defense 
minister.133 
In sum, the ladino-dominated elites and authoritative establishments had risen up 
alongside the Pan-Mayan movement and its allies in both subtle and overt ways in order to 
maintain their position as the country’s core hegemon. The intricate and interdependent 
power centers of the political, commercial, and military establishments proved to be adept 
generators, organizers, and user of hegemonic power to reinforce the historical 
arrangements that had woven the politico-economic-racial hierarchy of Guatemala. With a 
divided but reluctant political class that was trying to balance its historical prerogatives, 
international appeals, and domestic supporters, the articles of the referendum were 
swamped under layers of congressional wrangling and legal litigation in order to 
procedurally blunt its effects. This was even when segments of the elites tepidly accepted 
its premises. The commercial class, influenced by their drive for stability and the allure of 
NAFTA-like free trade discussions across the Americas, proved to be more cautious but in 
the end their opposition contributed to the outcome of the referendum.134 Likewise, for the 
military their only purpose was the maintenance of their historical privileges regardless of 
the effects on the civilian government and although many elements opposed the 
referendum the institution allowed it to march forward knowing that their interests were 
intact.  
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At this point in the study, we now see how the historical patterns of racism 
influenced the hegemonic hierarchies and social constructions of group relationships as 
manifested by the political-economic and cultural concentrations of power in a historic 
core hegemon, the ladinos, with other groups relegated to the peripheries. This study has 
also shown how the Maya constructed their identity and how it became the cornerstone of 
their resistance to the state during and after the civil war in the form of both armed and 
political mobilization. In turn, one can observe the dominant group, ladinos, rallying 
around their traditionally privileged power structures to yield the weight of national 
government, the military, and the economy against the Pan-Mayan movements and its 
autonomic drive. Now, this work proceeds into outlining the development and outcome of 
the ultimate Pan-Mayan goal, the 1999 constitutional referendum. 
D. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DRIVE OF 1999 
Our current question is what did the Guatemalan electorate ended up voting upon 
and how was the ballot developed? What was the outcome and its significance for the 
hegemonic arrangement within Guatemala? The answers to these questions lie in the 
deliberations taken within the national congress and in the eventual body of text that voted 
upon in May 1999. As detailed in prior sections, the Pan-Mayan movement was by no 
means entirely unified as it had significant divisions between its political and intellectual 
leadership and these with the wider Mayan populace and communal leadership. Likewise, 
the opposition was not preponderantly unified as there were establishment actors, such as 
President Arzú, who were actively pushing the accords along while others, such as the 
FRG, CACIF, and some members of the presidential cabinet, who had either wavered and 
had been decidedly against the peace process. Both sides resorted to intensive media and 
political campaigns to mobilize their respective bases and drive voter turnout in their favor 
however it proved foreboding that the conservative-led No vote was widely recognized as 
the more organized and funded campaign. Therefore, the product of the congressional 
committee processes alongside the ongoing political negotiations between all sides was an 
unruly document that muddled the highest expectations of the Pan-Mayan movement and 
safeguarded the interests of the ladino political-economic establishments.  
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The document produced symmetrically reflected the political environment that 
engendered it, a product that sought to culminate nearly four decades of violent ethnic 
conflict and oppression which themselves were the products of nearly two-hundred years 
of systemic racism and exclusivist nationalism. Aside from the growth and establishment 
of the Pan-Mayan movement and its unprecedented drive to constitutionally reimagine the 
Guatemalan state, the established forces of the PAN, FRG, and the military leadership 
along with the oligarchy were able to both procedurally blunt and operationally hamper the 
outcome of the referendum. The first step in the process began under UN moderation: 
bringing the government, CACIF, and the COPMAGUA-URNG together to create a 
common forum for negotiations that eventually included indigenous rights.135 Out of these 
negotiations, the Assembly of Civil Society (ASC) was established to negotiate the end of 
the civil war and its settlements in a multi-sectoral way.136 In March 1995, after months 
of haltingly tense discussions the Accord on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples was 
signed by all parties with significant concessions to COPMAGUA-URNG on issues that 
would constitutionalized indigenous rights and protections.  
This accord served as the forerunning template for the 1999 referendum agreement 
and ballot insomuch as it included provisions such as a declaration of the country as 
multiethnic, demilitarization, cultural protections, recognition of customary law, and land 
reforms.137 During the drafting of demands, COPMAGUA advocated for a federated, 
regionalized, and pluricultural platform that integrated the historical needs of the Mayan 
communities such as; recognition of indigenous leadership practices and governance, 
collective ownership of land and resources, expanded religious freedoms, and regional 
autonomy.138 On the other hand, the URNG advocated for national unification based on 
class and corporatist ideas of labor and guild affiliations in order to bridge the ethnic 
tensions that had fueled the most violent periods of the civil war.139  
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In the exchange between the camps, historical issues such as assimilationism, the 
hegemonic hold of ladinos, and the willful erasure or obliviousness to the systemic racial 
hierarchies of Guatemala resurfaced. Where the URNG saw American imperialism and the 
perils of capitalism, the COPMAGUA saw innate and adaptive continuities of racial 
discrimination and segregation that were tightly interwoven with the social and economic 
relationships of Guatemala.140 This was their basis for insisting on a federated state, 
regions that had their own governments and localized authority over education and cultural 
matters; however, the URNG and other leftist elements resisted any alternatives to the 
current Guatemalan state on the basis that doing so would risk ethnic conflict.141 
Thus, the fifty articles generated by the ASC, ramrodded through congress, and 
printed upon the referendum ballots touched upon four distinct areas that diluted the 
indigenous demands. The bulk of the indigenous demands were amalgamated under the 
banner of Nation and Social Rights that included the reclassification of the state as 
multiethnic, recognition of indigenous languages, general healthcare for the entire 
population, abolition of the military draft, and strengthened social services.142 The second 
area entail legislative reforms such as the expansion of the number of congressional seats 
and the creation of intelligence oversight and language officialization committees.143 The 
third category dealt with executive branch reforms, these revolved around the 
civilianization of the Minister of Defense position, extricate the army from domestic 
operations, increasing civilian control of military operations, and the creation of 
community councils to advise the president on local matters.144 And the final and fourth 
category deal with judicial reforms, these included the professionalization and 
depoliticization of the judiciary and the integration of indigenous governance and legal 
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systems into the national legal frameworks. These articles were approved and disseminated 
merely seventy-six days before the vote, not enough time for the electorate to have been 
educated on the nature and purpose of the provisions and to have had substantial debates 
over them.145 
With an abstention rate of 81%, 53% of voters who did cast a ballot voted against 
the referendum and thus rejected decade-long negotiations, campaigning, and political 
wrangling between the Pan-Mayan movement and the conservative forces within the 
country. Even within the eight regions that the Mayan communities dominated, they 
averaged an abstention rate of 78% and only carried four of them in the Yes column. If one 
breaks out these eight regions by the four categories the Mayan movement garnered the 
yes vote on the question of broader national and social rights in six out of eight regions, 
the yes vote on the legislative and executive reforms in only four regions, and on the 
judicial changes in five regions.146 Broadly, on the questions of indigenous rights, the 
majority of which were contained in the national and social rights category, the indigenous 
populations overwhelmingly approved of them but not enough to offset the ladino vote that 
was concentrated in the more heavily populated metro areas. 
As seen in Table 1, the Maya-majority areas highlighted in yellow attest to their 
unanimity—six out of eight departments—on the question of the nation and social rights 
which included the preponderance of indigenous rights. On all other categories, the Maya 
were scattered across the board with offering mixed support for an overhaul of the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Also, of note, when averaged out the 
abstention rate for non-Maya departments was around 83% whereas in the Mayan 
departments it was closer to 78% indicating that the Maya were relatively more enthusiastic 
about the vote than others. However, all of this is relative considering that only roughly 
19% of registered voters casted a ballot.147  
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Table 1. Guatemalan 1999 Constitutional Referendum Results by Department148 
 
All Mayan majority departments are highlighted in yellow. The winning side the various votes are highlighted in black fill and 
white lettering
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These results stemmed from a combination of the short campaign season that the 
Yes vote had between the approval of the ballot and the election date as well as the fact that 
most voters, when questioned, asserted they did not know enough about the provisions 
being voted upon.149 Additionally, one must also account for the fact that most of the 
Mayan population resides in rural areas that are often unreachable under certain conditions 
and that voting were concentrated in urban areas making transportation, logistics, and 
access major factors in dampening the vote.150 Along with the challenges of a rural 
population, one must also account for its educational levels where at the time ninety-two 
percent of the adult population possessed less than six years of formal education on top of 
the fact that many communities did not want to empower the government to be involved in 
their affairs.151 Another inhibiting factor was also that a great majority, seventy-one 
percent, did not see any personal benefits from the peace process and believed that wider 
Guatemalan society did not want to see change.152 
Altogether, the results of the referendum were dispiriting to the Pan-Mayan 
Movement because after a thirty-six civil war, nearly a decade of fraught negotiations, and 
overcoming centuries of racism, political-economic oppression, and staving off one of the 
region’s most ruthless militaries it was not able to overcome the inertia of disengagement. 
The opposition, through their political-economic-cultural hegemony, was able to blitz the 
Yes campaign with a constant barrage of negative television, radio, and newspaper ads in 
addition to splintering the Mayan and leftist intellectual classes. Politically outmaneuvered, 
stunted at the ballot box, and coerced into continuing the historical patterns of hegemony, 
the Pan-Mayan movement sputtered shortly thereafter never to recoup their former strength 
nor make the transition into a formal political party unlike those in other Latin American 
states.153 
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E. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE GUATEMALAN CASE 
After considering the historical development of the Guatemalan state, reviewing its 
systems of racism and hegemonic enforcement, while also distilling the ways the Mayas 
constructed their identity and politically mobilized around it, and faced the hegemonic 
counter-reaction, this chapter now arrives at its overall conclusion. Per the proposed theory, 
whenever an indigenous movement seeking constitutional change is unified, pluralistically 
appealing, and in possession of a strong coalition it can achieve increased autonomy or the 
sought-after constitutional reforms. In the case of the Pan-Mayan movement, we see that 
it was not as strongly unified as it was seen at the time with numerous divisions existing 
among its leaders, the rank and file, among the intellectual, traditional Mayan leaders, and 
the rural populations. In addition to this challenge, the referendum bares out that they were 
not universally appealing considering the effectiveness of the No coalition’s fear 
campaigns and warnings against granting what they termed special rights to what they 
perceived as regular Guatemalan citizens. And lastly, the COPMAGUA-URNG coalition 
was not broader than the leftist elements in both the domestic and international spheres and 
even internally suffered from ideological disagreements that hobbled the formulation of 
demands and the struggle for them.  
In line with our theoretical expectations, the Pan-Mayan movement simply did not 
build enough political strength across a wide enough range of actors to enact their reformist 
agenda. The hegemonic core group of Guatemala controlled a wide array of resources and 
institutions in such a way that it proved too resilient for even a former armed movement, 
such as COPMAGUA-URNG, to dislodge them from the center of that system. With these 
lessons in mind, our gaze now turns to the Andes where another nation with similar 
demographics, history, and social struggles experienced a starkly different outcome. That 
nation is Bolivia.  
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III. BOLIVIA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In many ways, Andean Bolivia is mostly a world away from the steamy tropical 
jungles of Guatemala but it shares in many ways the same historical trends that both 
countries endured since Pre-Columbian times. The forerunners of both nations were 
peoples who were mixed between rural networks and urbanized cultures that were held 
together by a variety of linked languages and political structures. Much like the Maya, their 
Andean counterparts, the Inca, had built expansive trading networks, amalgamated 
different peoples within the breadth of their influence, and built upon the traditions of 
disparate South American cultures. Much like their Mesoamerican counterparts, these 
civilizations would be conquered and annexed by the Spanish Empire as it expanded across 
the Americas and would be similarly governed for nearly four centuries.  
Both countries experienced similar journeys to independence—Guatemala in 1821, 
Bolivia in 1825—followed by liberal republican periods, a myriad of autocratic 
governments, the onset of the Cold War and the ever-looming United States, and finally 
democratization in the 1990s. In both countries, the indigenous population are demographic 
majorities. However, as we have seen in the Guatemalan case democratization in the 1990s 
only brought disenchantment to its burgeoning indigenous movement as it was strangled 
by its hegemonic arrangements and failed to realize the more plurinational and equitable 
state that they sought. On the other hand, only ten years after the Guatemalan failure, 
Bolivia had not only elected its first self-identified indigenous president but the movements 
and coalitions behind him were able to convened a constituent assembly that inaugurated 
a reimagined state. Their achievement ushered in the re-designation of the country as a 
plurinational state with protections, rights, and autonomic powers for an indigenous people 
that had been excluded from the centers of power since the Spanish conquest. Why? Why 
did these two similar trajectories diverge so dramatically? These and others questions will 
the focus of this chapter.  
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In this portion, this study will briefly survey the historical patterns of hegemony 
within Bolivia, then establish an understanding of the emergence and effectiveness of its 
indigenous movements, and contrast these with the hegemonic counter-reaction. Then, we 
shall examine the events in and around the constituent assembly of 2009 to examine the 
coalition building and political processes behind the rewriting of the constitution. 
Altogether, this chapter shall argue that, unlike in Guatemala, Bolivia not only had a 
strongly unified indigenous movement but that it also possessed a pluralistic program that 
allowed it to build coalitions across Bolivian politics in order to contest and renegotiate the 
hegemonic arrangements within that country.  
This will be set in contrast to our findings thus far in the Guatemalan case, where 
we identified a Pan-Mayan that was only loosely unified and its intellectual drivers were 
barely in synch with the traditional leadership structures of the indigenous communities in 
a seeming urban and rural divide. This weakness further influenced the movement’s entry 
into Guatemalan politics during and after the civil war where their demands became captive 
within the overall leftist programs put forward by their far-left allies. In turn, these demands 
were not inclusive of other key groups or parties within Guatemalan politics and thus 
hampered the Pan-Mayan movement’s ability to attract capable partners and appeal to other 
ethnic or class-based movements or groups. In the face of the historical hegemonic 
domination of the ladino elite, and their well organized counterreaction response, the Pan-
Mayanists’ challenge to the Guatemalan hegemonic hierarchies thus failed for lack of 
unity, programmatic inclusiveness, and effective alliances.  
1. Bolivia’s Colonial Legacies  
Much like in Guatemala, the Spanish Empire found in South America a land that 
was not at all dissimilar from Europe with centuries-old urban settlements, rural 
populations, and a variety of governing systems that wove their different sovereignties 
across the length of the continent. Chief among them was the Incan Empire, a centralized 
state whose capital Cuzco controlled a massive network of trade, societies, and services 
across the Pacific side of the South American continent from southern Colombia to the 
northern regions of Chile. In the Altiplano that spanned across the modern states of 
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northern Argentina and Chile, southern Peru, and nearly all of Bolivia, there developed a 
variety of both urbanized and rurally-based cultures that possessed a variety of systems of 
sovereignty derived from the different but complimentary ecological zones.154 The various 
systems of agriculture, food storage and trade, urbanization, and political-economic 
extraction of resources from different altitudes of the Altiplano attest to the diversity and 
sophistication of the societies the invading Spanish encountered upon their conquest of the 
former Incan networks and allies. And also, just as in Guatemala in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth-centuries, the Spanish were able to coopt existing political-economic structures 
of the indigenous cultures in order to benefit and fortify their colonization while interlacing 
these with the politico-economic-cultural hierarchies already pioneered in other parts of 
the Americas. 
The centrality of Bolivia’s colonial legacy to this study lays in its contextualizing 
effect. The history of racialized political-economic and social relations in Bolivia serves to 
properly demonstrate the scale of the challenges that the indigenous movements across its 
history would face and also to capture the centrality of these relations to Bolivian politics 
which persists to the modern day. By capturing their scale, it aids in understanding the 
pathways that indigenous movements followed in Bolivia in contrast with those followed 
in Guatemala.  
One of the legacies of the Incan Empire that were appropriated by the Spanish 
colonial authorities was the mit’a system that bequeathed the Incas with an on-demand 
labor supply that spanned the breadth of their dominion.155 This labor supply could be 
leveraged for a myriad of state needs such as water drainage projects, irrigation networks, 
and the construction of agricultural infrastructure which were all determined by the central 
authorities. Certain types of labor and production were mapped according to the resources 
and locales of each of the distinct ethnic groups within the empire which in turn fed a 
variety of products into state supply networks that ensured certain levels of provisions for 
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a given region or settlement.156 Among the types of labor that the Spanish found most 
lucrative, and that they enduringly exploited, were those mitas that had to do with mining 
which became central once the famed mines of Potosí were discovered.157 In this case, 
because Spanish officials applied two criterion—distance to the mines and elevation of the 
target people—they grafted the mita upon specific communities that they held were more 
predisposed to labor in the mines.158 These discriminatory practices went to weave a 
limiting atemporal institution unto these populations that limited their ability to own lands, 
participate in the market, and obtain economic development through the eighteenth, 
nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries through a series of institutional and 
political-economic continuities.159 
As the Spanish Empire consolidated its possessions within the Americas, its 
adaptation of indigenous institutions continued in other ways that were further imbued with 
their imagined concepts of accepted levels of development, definitions of rights and 
citizenship, as well as economic participation. One form was the census, something that 
also performed by the Incan Empire, but was furthered and adapted by the Spanish for their 
own needs gave rise to initial political, economic, and social stratifications within colonial 
Bolivia.160 In the Bolivian census at the time, ethnicity was racialized vis-a-vis the newly 
arrived Spanish and other immigrant nationalities, the creole descendants of the first 
conquistadors, and these definitions became naturalized along with certain economic roles. 
Once intermediary identities or political-economic roles, such as the caciques or local 
indigenous leaders—whom were responsible for conducting smaller censuses, organizing 
labor, and conveying tribute to the authorities—were liquidated, the whole the of 
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indigenous populations was homogenized.161 This was accomplished through the 
paternalism that imbued the actions and policies of the colonial government as it saw the 
indigenous population as naturally indigent, better fitted for service, and limited in their 
intellectual capacities which meant that the Spanish elites needed to “care for them.”162 
Ironically, because of their natural inferiority the indigenous populations were 
simultaneously granted exemptions from certain Spanish laws but also marginalized or 
limited in their actions or rights under others.  
By the end of the nineteenth-century, through various iterations the Bolivian state 
had solidified the political-economic role of the indigenous populations through the various 
qualifications that characterized citizenship and the obtainment of rights. In future 
censuses, the ability to own property and engage in commerce—which collaterally meant 
that the person was educated—became deeply intertwined with the blancos, or descendants 
of the Spanish creoles. Inversely, this made having property, being educated, speaking the 
Spanish language, and being catholic the prerequisites for being a Bolivian citizen.163 
Whereas the indigenous became identified with being laborers, farmers, artisans, and 
servants which created a peasant-like veneer over what it meant to be indigenous and 
therefore to have a diluted citizenship.164 In between these two major groups were the 
mestizos, whom shared traits, culture, and belonging with both spheres but that throughout 
Bolivian colonial and republican history were often pushed and pulled out of the 
indigenous and blanco classes. In what was a heavily stratified society at the time, where 
economic class and race often converged, the mestizos served as a buffer to buttress the 
white elites in the urban areas and fill niches that were too high for the indigenous peoples 
to obtain or too low for the white classes to hold.165 This interplay between economic 
status and race would not be confined to censuses but also spill out into the world beyond 
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officialdom as administrative powers became the premise for social and political-economic 
hierarchization that built the contours of the Bolivian hegemonic system.  
Based on these colonial legacy hierarchies, the streams of power were dammed and 
channeled to concentrate political-economic and social power within the landed blanco 
elites who opportunistically over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth-
century would ally on-and-off with the mestizos against the indigenous. These 
concentrations of power became so extreme that they warped the social fabric of Bolivian 
society and one metric was landownership where eight-percent of landowners held ninety-
five percent of the cultivable land of which less than one percent was farmed.166 In 
contrast, the mestizo and indigenous groups mostly owned farms that had less than ten 
hectares of land but that constituted little over more than two-thirds of the total number of 
farms of any size within Bolivia in the early decades of the twentieth-century.167 As a 
result, these measures serve as metaphors for the overall conditions under which Bolivian 
society transitioned into the twentieth century.  
2. Post-independence to 1952 
As this system trotted along in the aftermath of the War of the Pacific, which in 
1880 claimed Bolivia’s coastline in a lost to Chile, it was further primed by the emergence 
of an oligarchic republic that would vent formal power away from the military juntas of 
the nineteenth-century.168 Alongside the emergence of party politics, Bolivian mining 
made grew significantly in the way of tin and silver exports to world markets that furthered 
strengthened the hand of the blanco elites and ensnared indigenous laborers in similar ways 
the Spanish had previous done so in colonial times.169 The emergent oligarchic-republican 
politics, racially distilled that the basics of indigenous identity—communal ownership in 
the ayllus alongside traditional religion and languages—ran counter to the republican 
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principles of individual liberty and market economics.170 As the white class developed 
ideological divisions, between the conservatives who sought to preserve a neocolonialist 
and segregationist society and liberals who believed in republican but assimilationist 
principles, various alliances began to take shape between the indigenous and mestizo 
communities.  
Thus far, Bolivia had developed a nation-state building project that was being 
driven by the republican-oligarchies who were expanding their political-economic 
authority over the state while simultaneously subsuming those outside of the white class 
into an economic rather than ethnic group. The core hegemony within Bolivia at this time 
was sustained and fueled by the expanding mining industry and the white class’ vast land 
holdings along with their drive to rid the country of what they saw as its incompetent 
military leadership and thrust it into modernity by boosting its infrastructure development 
and reestablishing regional financial ties.171 With the establishment of a civilian 
presidency and a parliament, the elites consolidated their inherited political and economic 
dominance ensuring their hold on their identity-based privileges in defining the Bolivian 
nation in contrast to the indigenous and other ethnic groups.172 
Another defining event from pre-1952 Bolivia was the 1899 Revolt, where the 
global economics that had supported the fortunes made from silver mining shifted in favor 
of tin mining and likewise shifted political-economic power away from the conservative-
segregationist regimes to the assimilationist liberals and their indigenous allies. In their 
first mass military-political engagement since the eighteenth-century Tupac Amaru 
rebellion, the indigenous masses rallied behind the traditional Aymara leader Pablo 
Zárate.173 Although not necessarily the first time or arguably the largest alliance enjoyed 
between the liberals and indigenous populations, having allied before in the 1870s against 
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the hated caudillo Mariano Melgarejo174; this time around the liberals would succeed in 
breaking the conservative hold on the state.  
This odd alliance between liberal tin mine owners and indigenous communities 
against the ruling conservative silver mine owners was unique insomuch that the white elite 
divide was not very wide. However, the motives of the indigenous was tied to the liberals’ 
promises to respect communal landownership and institute traditional political 
structures.175 The hegemonic hierarchies that were established in the wake of Bolivian 
independence reemerged when during the war indigenous forces turned on their liberal 
allies resulting in the killing of liberal soldiers due to local conflicts. Reactionarily, the 
liberal leadership fearing the growing power of the indigenous forces decided to bid their 
time until the war was won to arrest the indigenous leaders, with Zárate among them, and 
execute them while also disbanding their militias.176  
This outcome of the 1899 Civil War cemented the character of the indigenous in 
the minds of many white political leaders, where the Bolivian state resurrected the notions 
of indigenous incapacity to govern, to progress, and to modernize without its paternal 
oversight. In this primordial imagining, the indigenous were seen not only as enemies of 
the state but as a race that needed to be dispensed off, either through assimilation or 
annihilation. Indigenous culture, in the liberal imagination, was wholly incompatible with 
the enlightenment values of individual rights, private ownership and enterprise, and the 
market economy thus morphing them into the national obstacle towards joining the global 
economy.  
Even with their ideological differences, the elites more or less maintained a stable 
system that disenfranchised and marginalized the vast majority of the indigenous 
population, estimated to be around fifty-one percent of a population that was nearly three-
quarters rural at the turn of the century.177 Up to 1934, the status quo for Bolivia meant 
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that the white elites maintained power through mining and agricultural landholdings, 
monopolized financing, and enforced their rule through a newly professionalized military 
that suppressed traditional indigenous leadership and protest movements. This stasis would 
continue up to 1952, when the Bolivian system received yet another jolt that would mold 
it into a more readily recognizable form of what it is today.  
3. 1952 to the Katarista Movement  
After 1900, the indigenous movements and their leaders never again allied with the 
established political parties and instead began percolating the concepts of indigeneity 
which sought to reinsert into the national conversation debates over the outlines of 
indigenous identity and its pertinent rights.178 At the same time, great portions of the 
liberal and conservative factions began converging on the national projects of spreading 
education—in the collateral hopes that it would eliminate indigeneity—and 
infrastructurally connecting Bolivia to the world market. The latter goal took the shape of 
railroad building which at times partitioned what use to be communal ayllu lands which 
were acquired through land seizures or other land liberalization tactics. Therefore, the post-
1899 Civil War landscape was one of national consolidation through the strengthening of 
state bodies, entrenchment of a national identity that eschewed indigenous languages and 
customs, and the export of metals and agricultural products to European and American 
markets. These developments further solidified the white elites’ hold on national resources 
and along with that economic power came political power as well which enabled them to 
imbue the state institutions with their proclivities and use them to preserve their group 
privileges.  
On the other hand, this period in the early twentieth-century proved to be a fertile 
time for indigenous movements within Bolivia as concepts of indigenismo, socialism, and 
nationalism all clashed, merged, and synthesized with each other with the backdrop of 
stable liberal rule and metastasizing regional conflicts. Among the key developments was 
that the caciques-apoderados—apoderados for short—emerged as the political leaders of 
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indigenous communities and largely took on the role of defending their land claims, 
cultural rights, and interfacing with the central government.179 Made up of largely 
Quechua and Aymara leaders, the apoderados endeavored to reverse the losses that 
indigenous communities had suffered since the onset of liberal rule in 1900 and as a result 
built a national network of Indian communal leaders that had no counterpart in the Andean 
region.180  
These apoderados channeled a primordialist attachment to the traditional 
entitlements of the ayllus of old, this connection being established through bloodlines and 
land titling done under the Spanish Empire or earlier conservative governments, which 
altogether was meant to unify communities under one protector as they had been in 
centuries past.181 This political claim to indigeneity proved to be salient and powerful, 
because as their networks grew denser they began to tie multi-sectorial communities—
artisans, miners, laborers—and in other cases multi-racial, such as the mestizos. The 
caciques then grew into the forerunners of the labor and indigenous movements that would 
dominate Bolivia later in the twentieth-century. Thus far, it can be seen that the white elites 
and then indigenous movements and its alliances are now beginning to take their modern 
form and set the stage for Bolivian hegemonic mechanics going further into the twentieth-
century. At this stage, the hegemonic core, occupied by the white elites, had become fully 
and sustainably established through their cooption of the state to their interests. While the 
peripheral groups, such as the indigenous communities, were only then beginning to 
strengthen the networks that would enable them to challenge the ossified social hierarchies 
and privileges later on in the century.  
At the same time, unlike in Guatemala’s Mayan movement, the intellectual class 
within the indigenous movement was beginning to culturally resurrect if not modernize the 
discourse around indigeneity and how it could serve as a moral and identity anchor for 
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Bolivian national identity. These intellectuals challenged what it meant to be an Indian, 
pushed back against both segregationist and assimilationist understandings of the 
indigeneity, and developed a counter-narrative of what Bolivia could become without 
espousing the dilution of any one race.182 Among these thinkers was Franz Tamayo, a 
mestizo, who represented a bridge from the old conservative segregationist tendency to 
sideline the Indian and the liberal assimilationism that sought to submerge them within a 
unified national identity.183 Similar to the ideas found within contemporary Mexican 
author Jose Vasconcelos’ Raza Cosmica, Tamayo elucidated on the primordial virtues of 
the indigenous race within the context on how its marriage with the European races created 
a uniquely positioned mestizo who could embody both worlds.184 What was key from the 
ideas espoused by Tamayo and others, such as the socialist Gustavo Navarro and Tristán 
Marof, was that the indigenous populations were inheritors of a bedrock civilization that 
compared in many ways to European achievements in the old world. Their primordial 
resiliency and skillfulness as witnessed in those areas where they were permitted to apply 
themselves were harbingers of their enormous potential for serving as the core identity of 
a fully integrated Bolivia.  
Thus far, on the one hand one can observe how the cacique apoderado represented 
the reestablishment of the traditional indigenous political leader and the intellectuals the 
reimagining of indigenous identity and how it related to the concept of the nation and state. 
Taken together, the two developments provided both the political-economic and 
intellectual-social basis for the synthesis of an indigenous movement that was both rooted 
in the traditional political structures of indigeneity while also asserting its claim to being 
part of the Bolivian nation thus rejecting segregationist and assimilationist views. This 
synthesis is most readily seen in how Tristán Marof’s Grupo Tupac Amaru called for the 
breakup of large haciendas and restoration of indigenous rights and the caciques 
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apoderados’ continual land claims in the 1920s. These claims evoked historical and 
primordial links to acts that were carried out in colonial times and previous presidencies 
while being petitioned by traditional leaders who saw themselves as heirs to the ancient 
caciques but now adapted to the republican structures in which they found themselves.185  
As Bolivia approached yet another historical fulcrum in the 1950s, it did so with a 
fully cemented white upper class that held sway over large portions of the economy and 
largely ruled unopposed within state institutions alongside a burgeoning indigenous 
movement that was ideologically and political maturing. From this perspective, the 
hegemonic landscape within Bolivia is becoming ever more contested but not to the point 
of a rearrangement or re-negotiation of hegemonic privileges or rights. However, the 
building blocks from the constitutional drive of the twenty-first century are starting to 
appear and take shape.  
The 1952 Revolution formally inaugurated the Cold War within the frontiers of 
Bolivia, and with it came an inflection point in the solidification of the indigenous 
movement and a period of conflict among the white elites. This began a period of military 
socialism, where zealous young army officers, who were veterans of the Chaco War, led 
the Bolivian state through some of the most radical reforms since independence. These 
included the redesigning of the constitution to reorient property ownership away from an 
inalienable right towards one contingent on social utility and nationalization of oil 
production alongside the manipulation of metal exports to increase government 
revenue.186 Within the conservative counter-reaction known as the Peñaranda emerges 
the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) and Party of the Revolutionary Left 
(PIR). These parties’ platforms proved to be the cascading evolution of the previous 
indigenismo-cacique apoderado networks and ideology. These parties were both leftist and 
they called for the nationalization of mines and unionization of labor but differed on 
indigenous rights. The PIR, along with a Trotskyite party, called for the breakup of landed 
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estates and peonage among the indigenous communities whereas the MNR, being 
composed of middle-class whites, was absent on this issue.187  
The clash between the traditional oligarchic elites and the emerging leftist 
movement, which was allied with indigenous groups, came to a head in the election of 
1951 when the MNR won a commanding victory. In response, the elites and the army 
launched an assault to halt the creation of an MNR government and annulled the electoral 
results while MNR responded with its own military mobilization, also supported by armed 
indigenous groups, that in 1952 successfully defeated the military enabling the party to 
seize power.188 As a result, the MNR responded by granting indigenous communities 
freedom from labor peonage, communal land reforms, and eliminating literacy 
requirements that delivered voting rights to the indigenous population.189 
However, aside from the party’s newfound openness to social justice and rights for 
the indigenous communities the MNR fundamentally still saw Bolivian society through a 
corporatist lens. This meant that for all the social progress, the MNR primarily saw and 
focused on economic class-based issues with an emphasis on unionizing all labor 
sectors.190 In that light, it began corporately federating across various economic sectors, 
which given Bolivia’s history were intertwined with racialized social roles; this had an 
adverse effect on the overt campaign for indigenous rights insomuch that the government 
officially became color blind. What this meant was that to the MNR there were only 
peasants where there was indigenous and so on. There were middle-class foremen and 
managers were there was mestizos. And naturally, there were union leaders or local 
officials where there were white elites. As demonstrated in other contexts, color-blind 
constitutionalism can serve as the pretext for threatening or lessening the diversity of race 
and culture within a state as a result from unabashed assimilationism into a perceived 
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higher cultural or political-economic identity leaving in place less overt form of racism and 
domination.191 
This fundamental reinterpretation of Bolivian society along class lines had the 
effect of diluting indigenous identity across those areas where there was not a strong 
indigenous political superstructure in the form of an established ayllu with a cacique 
apoderado; in the absence of these they turned to syndicalism.192 In this regard, the 
syndicalism of the MNR represented yet another evolutionary stage of the white elites’ 
monopolization of political-economic power. Through their reimagined efforts, the newly 
emergent elites were able to redefine the contours of citizenship, social organization, and 
structures of labor and production across the Bolivian economy. However, the MNR’s 
syndicalism did not lessen or dampen the steady growth of indigenous movements nor the 
subaltern saliency of indigenous identity as an alternative to the syndicalist structures. The 
syndicalism may have limited the political power of mobilizing around indigenous identity 
but it did not preclude organizing and theorizing around that notion.  
Even though the MNR discouraged the use of indigenous languages, dress, and 
other cultural expressions they could not dissuade or assimilate Indians into the peasantry 
or middle classes because during this time there was a significant indigenous discourse and 
social mobilization around its ideas.193 In direct challenge to the re-imagining of 
indigenous communities into a peasant, artisanal, or labor classes had relabeled Indians 
economically, continued their traditional political structures and self-conceptualization 
which negated their white-elite forged identities.194 In essence, their marginalization, and 
also their self-conceptualization, was not simply due to the state’s citizenship regime but 
an adapted racism that channeled white’s hierarchization of society in novel ways that 
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enabled their political-economic interests considering the core resource-supporters of the 
MNR. Percolating in this atmosphere was the burgeoning Katarista movement.  
The political-economic basis for the Kataristas’ re-mobilization of indigenous 
identity in direct challenge to the corporatism that had redesigned Bolivian society was the 
subaltern continuity of indigenous life. In a number of cases, the syndicalization of certain 
haciendas and its associated laborers merely followed the contours of the previous ayllu 
and in their daily life reproduced indigenous politics albeit re-labeled but unchanged.195 
The explicit aim of the land-reforms, increasing access to education, and political 
integration was not to allow for the liberty of indigenous expression but rather to assimilate 
the communities into a federated-capitalist society so as to dilute their core identity and 
subsume it into a nationalistic one.196 During this time parties such the Indian Party of 
Bolivia (PIB), were founded and relied upon Indianismo which counterintuitively argued 
that indigenous beliefs and practices were inherently superior to those of Hispanicized 
Bolivian society.197 This was counterintuitive insomuch that presupposed the superiority 
of indigenous cultures in much the same way the Hispanicized culture presupposed their 
superiority. As Bolivia entered a renewed period of military rule, following a near-
bloodless coup that toppled the MNR in 1964, Fausto Reinaga, PIB’s founder, penned that 
Bolivia must restore itself through the rebirth of indigenous culture and finally and 
definitely decolonize its imaginings of what meant to be Bolivian could be. Among these 
was the renewal of veneration for the great figures in indigenous history such as Tomás 
and Tupac Katari, reorient the intelligentsia away from imperialist discourses and 
ideologies—such as liberalism and communism—and liberate the Indian from the 
discursive and overt domination by the imposed European descendants.198 
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And thus, the ideological and political-economic foundations for Katarismo were 
established. Fausto’s discourses were key to the realization of a coherent line of thought 
and the subaltern continuities of indigenous political-economic life and leadership were 
central to concretizing political demands based on spatialized living conditions; these 
together became the basis for Katarismo. Named in honor of the fallen Aymara leader 
Tupac Katari, who was quartered by the Spanish, the Kataristas would lay the foundations 
for a plethora of groups, parties, and movement that would succeed, fail, splinter, and 
regroup throughout the remainder of the Cold War and especially blossom following 
Bolivian democratization in 1982. These groups would range from political parties to 
militant factions,  
In essence, Katarismo criticizes the lack of cultural integration, economic 
prosperity, and circumscribed political participation on part of the indigenous communities 
but unlike Indigenismo it does not seek to supplant Hispanicized Bolivian identity rather 
to broaden the contours of what it is to be Bolivian.199 Their plurinationalism and 
integrationist discourse and motives are laid within their “Manifesto of Tiwanaku,” where 
they not only outline the marginal existence of indigenous communities but call on the 
state, the press, the religious orders, and other socio-economic classes to join in their 
petition.200  
In contrast, the white-elites, as represented by a speech given by General Hugo 
Banzer Suárez, responded with the need to impose order, for peace in exchange for labor, 
to reject communism, decentralization of landownership, and promises of economic 
development.201 In the former, an integrationist message and in the latter, a segregationist 
or assimilationist one. Katarismo’s interweaving of class and ethnic solidarity and the call 
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for an integrated ethnically based Bolivia would be pillars of indigenous party evolution 
and building in all the way from the 1970s to the early 2000s.202  
Katarismo would veer between allying with centrist or leftists within the MNR 
while integrating various peasant and labor organizations such as the Unitary Syndical 
Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB).203 The merging of Katarismo 
with the syndicates under which the ayllus had be subsumed represented the fusion of two 
vital components of an indigenous movements, a guiding intellectual frame and that of 
indigenous political-economic institutions in the way of the syndicated ayllus and their 
legacy of cacique apoderados.204 
Taken altogether, the colonial legacies, the first several decades of independent 
Bolivia, and later its experiences under both leftist autocratic and military regimes all 
broadly shaped the contours of the Bolivian hegemonic system and would influence the 
outcome of the constitutional drive of 2009. From these distinct time periods, we see the 
emergence of a continuous but divided white-elite that adapted its colonial inheritance to 
the structures of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries through the monopolization of 
political, economic, and cultural power. The landed oligarchs of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth-centuries had perfected the hierarchization of Bolivian society with whiteness at 
the top, mestizos being battered between top and lower halves of society, and the 
indigenous continually and paternalistically at the bottom.  
Once these social and political-economic cleavages cemented, they influenced how 
Bolivian politics developed. Most overtly, one can see these dynamics in how a seemingly 
friendly political party, the MNR, could still be marginalizing and circumscribing to the 
indigenous communities. However, on the other hand we also see continuities in 
indigenous political-economic leadership that was later married with the intellectual 
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revivals on the 1930s and 1960s to create the ecosystem that would later make autonomic 
drives in 2009.  
With these concepts in mind, we now have the outlines and norms of the Bolivian 
hegemonic system. The continuity of coloniality through either segregationist or 
assimilationist elites who concentrated political-economic and cultural power under 
various ideological constructs whether they were oligarchic republicanism, liberalism, 
corporatism, military dictatorship, or neoliberalism. The anchor of the elites would always 
be the white landowning classes who dominated the agricultural, financial, and political 
sectors and institutions. On the other hand, we also a continuity of not only indigenous 
culture and identity but of outwardly and inwardly recognized political-economic 
institutions who are imbued and steeped in indigenous identity. Along with this indigenous 
continuity was also a continuity in their centrality to any movement that desired to rule 
Bolivia as their demographics and sectoral power made them a force to be courted 
throughout Bolivian political history until the indigenous developed their own ideology. 
Katarismo proved to be the intellectual movement that would enabled indigenous political 
leaders to unify and mobilize their communities to rise above their individual tribes or 
groups. With this political unity came political potency as the white-elites became ever 
more divided.  
4. The Basis for the Constitutional Moment of 2006–2009 
Prior to the constitutional drive of 2006–09, there were two significant events that 
would color that constitutional drive; one was the increasing lucrativeness of coca and 
natural gas exports in the 1980s through the 2000s and the other was the constitutional 
reforms of 1994–95. The construction of various pipeline networks between Santa Cruz in 
the southeast and natural gas consortiums in Argentina and Brazil quintupled production 
between the 1990s and mid-2000s making it the top Bolivian export by 2001.205 These 
economic leaps then converge with the democratization of Bolivian politics which led to 
the fracturing or discarding of traditional alliances, centralism, and peasant-loyalty 
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guarantees as well as the mobilization of indigenous protests such as the 1990 march from 
El Beni to La Paz by dispossessed Indians.206 In 1993, the MNR returned to power with 
the support of Katarista parties and over the following two years reformed certain 
constitutional provisions that re-designated Bolivia as a multiethnic and plurinational state 
while also legalizing communal land ownership and traditional indigenous political 
institutions and offices.207 These alliances between the Kataristas and the MNR resembled 
the earlier indigenous-MNR alliances that were forged in the wake of 1952 Revolution 
albeit without the syndicalist trappings. However, in contrast with the 1950s these new 
alliances were taking place in a much-reconfigured political landscape where the Kataristas 
were now the headliners of powerful localized indigenous parties.  
Along with these overtures to the indigenous vote, the MNR also instituted a 
decentralization and devolution of autonomy to the different municipalities within the 
country.208 These measures enabled indigenous candidates to stand for election and win 
over two-thirds of municipal offices and further localize Bolivian politics.209 Against the 
backdrop of privatization of the state oil, railroad, and power companies, emerged 
significant social pushback from civil organizations that saw these neoliberal moves as 
straightjacketing national sovereignty and the imposition of foreign economic 
domination.210 In this instance, these social movements against neoliberal economic 
policies mostly focused on spatial occupation and visibility to build their political capital 
and enforce their demands of free and national use of natural resources, economic 
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development assistance, and the immediate halt to land privatizations.211 Among these 
demands were also the petition for the creation of a constitutional convention. 
This social mobilization, in response to the now-labeled neoliberalization of the 
Bolivian economy—itself a continuing tradition of the elites’ monopolization of national 
resources and seeking of international trade—helped pave the road towards the constituent 
assembly in 2006. This conjunctural moment brought together the long running trends of 
strengthening indigenous movements, increasing fracturing among the elites, and the now 
omnipresence of democratization efforts among the breadth of the Bolivian polity. In 
addition to the indigenous waves that washed over municipal institutions and their 
empowerment by the central government, the ayllu leadership of old now found themselves 
in the halls of formal legal power within the governments that once sidelined them. Out of 
this milieu emerged the actors, parties, and alliances that would compete for the special 
election of 2006 that would decide who would take part in the constituent assembly that 
would draft the future constitution. 
B. THE INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT 
The first question in this section is who is the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) 
and its leader Evo Morales and how were they were able to patch together and overcome 
the immense diversity of indigenous movements—from Aymara to Quechuas, Kataristas 
to Indigenistas, Urban and Rural, laborers and middle-class managers—to create a united 
front against an organized and entrenched opposition? How effective was their coalition 
building? These questions and others are the heart of the following analysis for it will strive 
to reveal how Morales, the MAS, and their allies were able to reasonably consolidate their 
position in order to redraw the contours of Bolivian hegemonic mechanics. The challenge 
of unifying thirty-six different ethnic and linguistic groups spread across the country in 
urban and rural settings was daunting to say the least especially when more than half of the 
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indigenous population was divided between equally sized groups, the Aymara and 
Quechua who often quarreled with each other.212 
MAS itself was a party that evolved in 1998 that, similar to the Pan-Mayanists in 
Guatemala, was anchored in a specific region, the department of Cochabamba, a specific 
group, Quechua-speakers, and a specific sector, coca growers known within Bolivia as 
cocaleros.213 However, their expansion beyond these confines must be placed within the 
context of continuous political experimentation by a variety of Aymara-specific Katarista 
parties that emerged before and after the period of democratization in 1982. Among these 
were the MITKA, MRTK, MRTKL, FULKA, MKN, and Eje Pachakuti (EJE), as one can 
observe by the recurring letter of their acronyms being ‘K’ which stands for Katari all of 
these parties emerged in the 1970s and 1980s but struggled to attract voters because of their 
exclusivist platforms.214 Their platforms were characterized by intense Aymara 
nationalism that alienated other indigenous peoples such as Quechuas as well as non-elite 
white or mestizo parties and groups that shared economic or political woes with the 
indigenous communities.215 They also did not recruit candidates from these other groups 
and predominantly focused their efforts only in Aymara-dominated regions. Consequently, 
MAS’ origins with a specific regional community and labor group were not out of the norm 
for an indigenous party but what was extra-normative was their political ascendancy.  
In response to both the ongoing neoliberalization of the economy and the United 
States’ anti-drug eradication efforts against coca farming, the cocaleros in 1988 
Cochabamba decided to join forces with other syndicates (i.e., thinly relabeled indigenous 
groups) through the Aymara-Katarista-created CSUTCB.216 One the central nodes around 
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which MAS was able to expand beyond its Quechua confines was its class-based 
connection with coca growing. The cultivation of coca was a shared feature of Andean 
indigenous culture and served as the unifying nexus between Aymaras and Quechuas 
because it was also a proxy for indigenous identity which was threatened by the Bolivian 
state and its American ally.217 This issue resonated across ethnic and class-based groups.  
MAS percolated within the cocalero movements that were permeating and allying 
with other groups across the ethno-syndical political system of neoliberal Bolivia that 
resulted in CSUTCB being dominated by Quechua cocaleros, Evo Morales among 
them.218 As the future-MAS members splintered from various indigenous organizations, 
such as the CSUTCB and Lowland indigenous-oriented Confederación Indígena del 
Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB), they created Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los 
Pueblos (IPSP).219 In turn, through the IPSP Morales sought to reach out to a broad set of 
electorates that were cross-ethnic, cross-class, and cross-regional. These included Quechua 
speakers, white and mestizo voters, urbanites, and rural workers through inter-ethnic, inter-
class, and broad populist appeals.220 The long-range result was that in 2005 nearly two-
thirds of MAS’ voters were indigenous language speakers, nearly a quarter of mestizo 
Spanish speakers, and about seven percent white.221 
In the aftermath of the democratization and liberalization of Bolivian politics in the 
mid-1990s and the neoliberalization of its economy, the indigenous movements responded 
politically through the ballot and the street protest.222 A significant number of MAS 
supporters emerged from the landownerships protests in the Bolivian lowlands who had 
been affected by neoliberalization’s encroachments onto their properties and 
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livelihoods.223 The lowland organization CIDOB would be one of the key organizations 
that would call for a constituent assembly in 2002. These and others would come to create 
the Pacto de Unidad, a pact formed in 2004, before the electoral coming of Evo Morales, 
and collectively they represented not only various organizations but the latest in a long, 
continuous line of indigenous activism and demands that in cases stretched back to the 
early twentieth century if not longer.224 The PdU’s composition is Bolivian indigenous 
activism history writ-large and collected under one umbrella front, from lowland 
communities, highland Aymara Kataristas, and urban dwelling indigenous communities 
like those in Cochabamba.225  
It must also be noted that MAS itself was not conceived strictly in indigenous terms, 
although its leader, Evo Morales—an Aymara cocalero farmer—and a number of 
organizations that would compose were, it also served as a bridge for traditional syndicalist 
organizations to mobilize.226 These other organizations included leftist, Trotskyites, self-
identifying peasants, and poorer landowners which altogether meant that MAS was not 
necessarily tied to any one indigenous community or syndicated sector but had an inherent 
ideological flexibility and organizational capacity to absorb or fully mesh with any needed 
political ally.227 Therefore, unlike say the Pan-Movement in Guatemala where it had 
neither an indigenous party or a broadly accepted political ally, the MAS in Bolivia had 
the capacity to ally with or widely dispersed and differing ethnic groups or class-based 
sectors and was able to do so without necessarily alienating any one sector entirely. 
However, one drawback to this key feature is the MAS vulnerability to in-fighting and 
ideological dissonance hence one must ask how did they overcome such potential divisions 
in its confrontation with Bolivia’s entrenched elites? 
One way the MAS was able to coopt any internal divisions and unify the 
preponderance of indigenous organizations was to emphasize itself as a political tool, after 
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all this aspect is highlight in the full name, Movement towards Socialism-Political 
Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples. Once they become an elected opposition 
party within the legislature in 2002, MAS emphasized their access to the state and its 
potential for increasing indigenous participate within it.228 As a result, they united forty 
legislators from three different parties into a parliamentary coalition. This enabled MAS to 
represent the indigenous communities, their supporting non-government organizations, and 
allied syndical elements as a viable oppositional force.229 This legislative presence allowed 
the MAS to become, for the first time in Bolivian history, the de facto conduit for 
indigenous opposition within the state and tie their interests to that of other marginalized 
economic classes. One party within the coalition, the Movimiento Indigena Pachackuti 
(MIP), was explicitly indigenista, while others surprisingly emanated from the right such 
as a few members from the Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR).230 
Thus far, the MAS had avoided the mistakes made by earlier indigenous-driven or 
inspired parties, such as the original Kataristas in the 1980s and 1990s who failed to make 
gains beyond their Aymara base or indigenista sympathizers because of their emphasis on 
ethno-nationalism, which excluded mestizo and Quechua populations.231 As a result of 
this lesson, Morales and the MAS’ allies began pressuring the government to grant the 
nation a constituent assembly that would address what they saw as the structurally 
foundational and primordial problems of the Bolivian state and subsequently the economy 
that they argued affected every social class.  
After obtaining experience in the legislature and further consolidating their 
alliances, the MAS headed into the 2005 elections with momentum and with Evo Morales 
headlining the presidential ticket they garnered a historic victory for the indigenous 
communities. Not only did indigenous representation across multiple levels of government 
dramatically increase, for the first time in the country’s history a self-identified indigenous 
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candidate won and did so decisively with nearly 54% of the vote.232 The platform that 
Morales campaigned on during this election included calling for a constituent assembly to 
rewrite the constitution.  
Thus far, in this section we have detailed how the MAS was formed, the 
effectiveness of their alliances and the inclusiveness of their program as well as their 
broader demands. Although MAS in of itself was not a historic indigenous organization, it 
benefitted from an environment that had been shaped by many other forces before them 
such as the development of the cacique apoderados and the continuing evolution of the 
Kataristas alongside the continuities of indigenous political-economic structures that 
existed under a syndicalist veneer. Together, along with the democratization that began in 
1982, these forces allowed the emergence of many Katarista parties that competed and 
failed to win meaningful representation in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The liberalization 
brought about by the constitutional reforms in 1995 further strengthen the growth of 
indigenous parties and set the stage for their sweeping return in the 2002 elections. With 
the economic backdrop of neoliberalism and its inspiring of intense backlash from 
indigenous communities, the MAS was able to evolve from an Aymara-dominated regional 
parties with syndicalist overtones into an electoral alliance that was sectorally and 
ethnically diverse. By recruiting candidates and striking pacts with syndical, class-based, 
ideologically different, and cross-ethnic groups the MAS was able to turn itself into the 
main opposition conduit and seize an overwhelming victory in 2005.  
In light of these developments, a strong, distinct, and cohesive indigenous 
movement can be observed which was also in-touch with both traditional indigenous 
politics and an intellectual class that had forged a path towards integrating indigenous 
beliefs into a liberalist state through Katarismo. Through their alliances with mestizo, 
white, and other syndical groups we can also observe that MAS’ goals connected with 
significant portions of the elites who leaned towards them and in addition to this they were 
able rally civil society groups who were now taken advantage of the rights extended to 
them in 1995. Altogether, these elements serve to starkly contrast the effective unity and 
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broadly and saliently acceptance of the MAS’ program with the fragile unity that the Pan-
Mayan movement enjoyed in Guatemala additionally hobbled by their weak coalition 
building.  
The key lessons from this brief study on the development of indigenous movements 
and more specifically the MAS is their unity, broad coalition building, and programmatic 
inclusiveness by the year 2005. These features tell us that the MAS and its indigenous allies 
were a formidable political force that although was historically rooted in the indigenous 
communities and indigenous intellectual traditions such as Katarismo they were able to 
also appeal to non-indigenous electorate. This enabled them to rise above the mistakes of 
the first Katarista parties and build a network of alliances that could challenge the 
hegemonic hierarchies of Bolivia. 
C. THE HEGEMONIC COUNTER-REACTION 
One aspect about the opposition that becomes readily apparent is its continual 
dilution and fragmentation since the fall of the military junta in the early 1980s up to the 
run up to the constitutional referendum in 2009. Gone are the powerful landed oligarchs 
who through their collective ownership dominated the Bolivian economic in every way 
from production to export. Gone were the conservative segregationist that sought to 
preserve the colonial relationships between the white elites and the indigenous populace. 
Gone were the liberal assimilationist who utilized the indigenous communities to defeat 
the conservative and even though they extended rights, education, and economic 
development to them it was with the ulterior motive of dissipating the Indian from Bolivia 
society. Gone are the corporatist who subsumed indigenous communities into their 
syndicalist imaginings along with the military juntas who rebirthed a new colonialist 
structure.  
In the aftermath of these changes was democratization and the fragmentation of the 
elites, even though they still held economic power and this was increased in the 1990s with 
the advent of neoliberal political-economics that power alone could not guarantee their 
monopoly on state power. Therefore, this section seeks to outline the nature of and 
effectiveness of the opposition in the run up to the 2005 elections starting with the post-
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Cold War era. The purpose of this is to outline their strategies and methods of contestation 
in light of the indigenous movements’ demands for a hegemonic renegotiation.  
The opposition that struggled against the MAS and their allies was made up of the 
omnipresent landowning elites who dominated the agricultural business of the eastern 
departments of Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, Beni, and Pando which together geographical 
resemble a half moon and it is why these groups became known as the Media Luna.233 
Together they represented the centuries-old hegemonic arrangement with their 
concentration of wealth and privileged political positions which were furthered intensified 
by the post-Cold War neoliberalization of the Bolivian economy. In the late 1980s, with 
the onset of democratization political parties dominated by the white core hegemonic group 
began appealing to the newly empowered indigenous groups first through corporatist or 
clientelist language and later moved on to setting programmatic appeals. These included 
the Bolivian approval of the International Labor Organization’s Convention 169, 
recognizing indigenous landownership, and the decentralization constitutional reforms of 
1995–97.234  
Also, in 1993 the decades-old MNR returned from its political exile to lead a 
government that would usher in the tenets of neoliberalism and resultantly reform the 
economy in such a way that it threatened the livelihoods of the indigenous communities, 
especially those areas with natural gas and agribusiness.235 In turn, much like the MNR in 
an earlier age, these economic reforms were tied to loans from the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank which were meant to accelerate the privatization of government 
mines that had the effect of eliminating thousands of miners from the labor market.236 For 
these economic changes, the MNR was routed in the 1997 elections which gave way to a 
unique figure in Bolivian politics, Hugo Banzer.237 However, Banzer, a former military 
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dictator of Bolivia, pursued an uncontroversial administration and as he fell to ill health 
was replaced by his vice-president who was not elected to a full term in 2002.238 Instead, 
the MNR returned with Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada as its leader and disastrously followed 
the same neoliberal policies that had fueled the emergence of MAS and its allies in the 
national legislature. The privatization of water networks, the state natural gas company, 
and the historical re-linking with Chilean financing and extracting Bolivian resources and 
shipping them to the sea across Chile all contributed to the eventual banishment of the 
MNR in 2005.239  
As it can be traced thus far, the opposition in Bolivia had dramatically changed and 
collapsed. Although they retained certain significant economic privileges that were 
historically rooted in the white upper classes’ hegemonic domination, politically they had 
collapsed in the face of democratization and, ironically, neoliberalization. Although in 
other Latin American states neoliberalism tended to benefit the established core hegemonic 
elites, and it did in Bolivia as well, it can also be observed that in this part of the Andes it 
came with a heavy political price. After winning elections with razor thin margins in 1995 
and 2002, and even after granting by historical standards significant rights and freedoms 
to the indigenous communities and other minorities it was not enough to abate the sense of 
frustration and injustice felt in part by those communities. As a result, in 2002 politically-
speaking the elites collapsed and dissolved into various smaller parties that hollowed out 
any potential coalitions that could have rivaled the MAS. In addition, no one significant 
elite personality emerged that could politically unite the traditionally non-indigenous main 
parties and thus the landscape not only shifted in favor of the MAS but it became an 
overwhelmingly permissive environment for them. The opposition’s few remaining tools, 
economic dominance for example, were not enough to dislodge the foothold that social 
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movements who mobilized with the MAS had on the legislature and eventually the 
presidency.  
In December 2005, the surviving opposition elite-party, PODEMOS, garnered little 
over forty percent of the vote in light of the MAS’ nearly fifty-six percent. Shunned by 
voters at the national level, the opposition retreated in the Media Luna areas where their 
economic wealth was concentrated enough to ensure their regional political prospects.240 
In an intriguing manner, the hegemonic dynamics of Bolivia became asymmetrical, where 
political and economic power became nearly decoupled as the indigenous movements 
consolidated their national and municipal holdings the white-elites furthered the economic 
standing in the periphery. In this regard, the elites had insulated themselves economically 
from a peripherally regional perspective but had been turned into a de facto or de jure 
politically peripheral group. Therefore, Bolivian hegemonic mechanics, unlike in 
Guatemala, decoupled political and economic power and produced an interesting core-
peripheral hegemonic relationship between the white, mestizo, and indigenous 
communities. 
The main take away from this section is the fractured, decoupled, and regionalize 
nature of the conservative parties in the face of the MAS and its allies. The white 
hegemonic elites were still economically powerful but their political power had been 
diminished to the point where they did not hold credible sway over the state and had been 
reduced to a regional peripheral existence. In this regard, the MAS had already rearranged 
a large of component of the Bolivian hegemonic system. This was the regionalization of 
what use to be the national order of power. Now that PODEMOS and its allies had been 
reduced to a regional block we now look to how these dynamics played out during the 
constitutional drive itself.  
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D. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DRIVE OF 2005–2009 
With 53% of the vote won by MAS in December 2005, the path towards redefining 
the Bolivian hegemonic system was in play.241 Evo Morales had made rewriting the 
constitution one of his main pledges during the campaign and in 2006 began pursuing that 
goal. The Bolivian constitution of 1967, as amended in 1994–95 and 2005, contained two 
provisions on how to rewrite it; one entailed obtaining a two-thirds majority in the 
legislature to write and approve constitutional provisions or call for a constituent assembly 
special election, in either way the new provisions would have to be put to a national 
referendum for final approval.242 In light of the tectonic shifts in Bolivian politics with the 
indigenous’ resurgence and the elites’ collapse, Morales commanded a broad mandate to 
rewrite the constitution his coalition did not have a two-thirds majority. As a result, the 
route that the MAS and their allies would take would be through a special election in 2006 
that would elect the delegates who would then compose the constituent assembly (hereon 
the CA) tasked with rewriting the constitution.  
In the runup to that election, the opposition rallied around the “June Agenda” that 
in essence sought to regionalize what had been the national hegemonic arrangements that 
had benefitted the hereditary landowning class that now economically dominated the 
lucrative peripheries of Bolivia.243 The irony was that the autonomic demands that had 
long been the domain of indigenous politics were now being discursively coopted by the 
near-former core-hegemons of Bolivia as a means to further and entrench their group 
privileges in the Media Luna regions. In another interesting development within the 
Bolivian autonomic drive was the reversal of discursive elements between the indigenous 
and elite-linked parties. And thus, this became the basis of their counter-reactive strategy 
on the road to the 2006 special election. Another concept the Media Luna elites coopted 
was bargaining for formulaic proportional representation in the election of CA delegates 
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that would still reward parties that under other circumstances and rules would normally 
have not been awarded representation.  
This entailed wrangling the MAS to accept that the country be partitioned into 
seventy-three-member constituencies of which two would go to the party with a plurality 
of the vote while the runner up would obtain the third member seat.244 Additionally, the 
country’s nine regions would also be given CA delegates in the form of five-member-
delegations. These would be decided in the following manner; the majoritarian party would 
receive two seats where the following three runner ups would receive one seat each.245 
The MAS counter-offer to this breakout was to accept the premise of the constituency 
partitions but with a winner-takes-all provision where any party that wins a majority in a 
given constituency is awarded all the seats in it.246  
The impetus behind this PODEMOS demand was to blunt and contain the 
overwhelming percentages that MAS was expected to generate, because if MAS was able 
to accrue say fifty-five percent of the vote this proportion would not translate into fifty-
five percent of the seats for a given electoral division. If anything, the most an outright 
victor could win was two seats at the constituency level and an additional two at the 
regional one. Altogether, a party that could muster a victory similar to MAS’ 2005 could 
be theoretically locked into only obtaining one-hundred-fifty-eight seats out of an available 
two-hundred-fifty-five; a number short of the two-thirds majority in the CA.  
Altogether, MAS dropped their natural objections to this demand and granted it to 
the opposition PODEMOS citing the need to have a multi-perspective and broad 
consensus-driven drafting process with the CA. On the other hand, MAS also had a 
blunting strategy as well because it was composed of various organizations who could also 
run their own candidates which meant that even if MAS won a large enough margin that 
trigger the theoretical ceiling independent but sympathetic candidates winning through 
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smaller parties would pick up the remaining seats. Together, they could create coalitions 
to obtain a two-thirds majority. 
On this basis, the elections took place in July 2006 and unsurprisingly MAS won 
little more than fifty-percent of the vote with their next closest rivals ranging in the sixteen 
to seven percent reflecting the fragmented and incohesive elite-linked parties.247 This 
result further solidified the hegemonic decoupling along geographical, ethnic, and socio-
economic lines as the western indigenous-dominated but poorer departments gain 
majorities in contrast to the eastern white-dominated but richer departments won lower 
numbers of seats.248 The final count was 137 assemblypersons for MAS and with the 
remainder scattered across PODEMOS and other opposition parties, short of the two-thirds 
majority. However, symbolically, that number represented a mandate for Evo Morales and 
his allies. With over fifty-five percent of delegates self-identifying as indigenous, little 
more than half being below the age of forty, and a third being women.249 The CA was 
truly diverse and representative of the MAS’ reach across different segments of society 
which made it a historical development unto itself.  
Beginning in August 2006, the assembly began the formal debate and procedures 
for generating, discussing, and designing the reforms that would supplant the 1967 
constitution. The first scuffles between the factions revolved around what constituted 
majorities for the passing of articles, with MAS demanding they be approve by simple 
majority whereas PODEMOS pushed for two-thirds votes. PODEMOS overcame in this 
first battle through effective street campaigning and protesting outside the CA’s convention 
center resulting in articles needing two-thirds approval to move to the final referendum 
while MAS was able to propose articles with simple majorities, marking this as one of the 
more significant conservative victories..250 Later conflicts revolved around the location of 
the seat of government, independence of the CA from the state, the influence of external 
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actors and their parties over the CA voting blocks, and frequently the MAS became a 
mediator of sorts between extremes.251 
However, for all their overwhelming electoral mandate the MAS could not outright 
dismiss the PODEMOS factions for they continued their pressure campaign outside the 
confines of the CA and the ballot box. They organized marches, sit-ins, and hunger strikes 
and while attracting considerable press coverage aimed to paint the MAS as totalitarians 
bent on tearing Bolivia and instituting indigenous domination.252 This was resolved by 
requiring a two-thirds vote at the committee then full-CA levels as well as a final collective 
two-thirds approval on the entire text.253 In this manner, the hegemonic counter-reaction 
was resorting to bureaucratic procedures and popular protests and civil disobedience to 
slow down or dilute the texts of the individual articles on topics such as land reform and 
regional autonomy among others.254 The next question then becomes, what did Bolivians 
actually vote on? 
The actual text of the constitutional reforms contained various provisions that had 
been sought after by the indigenous communities for centuries. The declaration of Bolivia 
as a plurinational state, decolonization of the state and society, autonomic architectures for 
the Ayllus, and the complete elimination of monoculturalism and filtered citizenship.255 
On economic matters, the Media Luna civic committees that represented the oligarchs and 
financiers were more successful in having the MAS compromise. One principal was the 
curtailment of absolute localization of natural resource rights where the state maintained a 
strong mandate to utilize them for the national benefit however with prior non-veto 
consultation with the local community, a compromise between indigenous communities 
and regional oligarchs.256 The state was to also recognize thirty-seven indigenous 
languages alongside Spanish as well intercultural unity through a decentralization that was 
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heavily guarded by a government-led process.257 Overall, the final text that was presented 
to voters on January 25, 2009, contained over five-hundred articles that were generated by 
twenty-one committees over the span of little over a year.258 With 61% of voters approving 
the final document, promulgated the following February.259 This vindicated centuries of 
indigenous activism and political-economic-socio continuity in the face of five centuries 
of multi-modal oppression and a conservative campaign that painted the central 
government as totalitarian and exclusivist.260 For their part, the conservatives continued 
asserting for the right to create autonomous regions and limited their campaign to a passive 
acceptance of the new constitution and promises to contest it through future legislation261 
E. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE BOLIVIAN CASE 
When contrasted with the Guatemalan case, the Bolivian outcome seems 
astounding. The indigenous movement that competed in the elections following 
democratization in 1982 and that won a complete revamping of the constitution in 2009 
were deeply rooted in Bolivian history and represented the continuity of indigenous 
communities from Pre-Hispanic times to the present. They were able to coalesce a distinct 
indigenous identity at the ayllu, municipal, and regional levels that preserve their 
traditional power structures while adapting their self-conception to the trappings of the 
liberal state that had come to encompass their traditional lands. In the face of a 
simultaneously segregationist and assimilationist early republican and oligarchic 
government in the late nineteenth-century, the indigenous peoples were able to reclaim 
some of their communal lands and the offices of their traditional caciques which laid their 
political-economic foundations for future actions. In the face of a corporatist revolutionary 
government, they preserved these structures even when they were subsumed by the state’s 
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reimagining of their identity and in spite of that still developed the Katarista intellectual 
movement that gave them an intellectual pole to rally around and imbue future movements 
with. Finally, in the face of a segregationist-corporatist military junta they were able to 
form the first indigenous parties but were only able to compete in elections once that regime 
gave way to democracy.  
Under democracy, the indigenous movement, by now fusing the traditional power 
structures with a Katarista self-conception, quickly expanded and capitalized on their 
demographic and mobilization advantages to broad their coalitions to include other 
economic classes and ethnic groups. This first fragmented the elites and later eroded the 
1967 constitution to such a degree that they were able to expand their political freedoms 
for the first time since 1952. These freedoms then became the launch point for their 
legislative victories in the 2002 and 2005 elections which paved the way for the 
establishment of the constituent assembly that would eventually topple over five centuries 
of indigenous marginalization. 
The main points one needs to keep in mind from this section are the larger contrasts 
between Bolivia and Guatemala. Aside from the fact that both countries possessed 
indigenous majorities and both saw the rise of indigenous movements, only one of these 
was able to reimagine the state and enshrine its autonomic rights and protections. Whereas 
in Guatemala the Pan-Mayanists struggled in many ways to connect with the indigenous 
communities and national politics, the Bolivian movements bridged these divides 
inclusively and effectively. Where in Guatemala the conservative counterreaction was well 
organized and effective, the Bolivian opposition was fragmented and unable to hold onto 
to their national hegemony causing them to regionalize themselves. These and a number of 
other reasons are why the two cases are instructive on the matter of identity, socio and 
political mobilization, and how these influence the construction of nation-states.  
As this study draws to its final conclusion, the outlines of our theory and how it 
fared in two very similar situations with wildly different outcomes had become clearer. 
The keys of a unified and solid indigenous identity and is able to build a broad multi-
sectoral and multi-ethnic coalition stands a greater chance of obtaining enhance 
constitutional protections or greater autonomic, self-determination provisions. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
As this thesis ends the story of two cases of indigenous mobilization and attempted 
constitutional transformations, it takes stock of what has been discovered. It examined the 
historical development, progression, counterreaction to, and aftermath of the Guatemalan 
Pan-Mayan and Bolivian Indigenous movements in order to offer an alternative 
explanation to their wildly divergent outcomes. Whereas in Guatemala nearly twenty-years 
of political work culminated in a failed referendum that would have expanded indigenous 
rights, freedoms, and protections, the Bolivian movement was not only able to escape a 
similar fate but usher in a plurinational state.  
This study argued that for an indigenous movement to become strong enough to 
significantly rearrange the hegemonic hierarchy or successfully obtain expanded 
constitutional rights, freedoms, and protections it needed to: achieve widely accepted unity 
and be representative of the majority of indigenous communities, be programmatically 
inclusionary, and form alliances with other ethnic and non-ethnic groups to create a strong 
enough coalition against the core hegemon. The structure of this work necessarily limited 
the analysis and exploration into other equally relevant subjects that can enlighten the 
reader on how indigenous politics blossomed across a region despite being suppressed, 
subsumed, and ostracized by generations of political-economic elites and outside powers. 
The path of this thesis reflects an earnest attempt to compartmentalize and streamline a 
narrative that is cohesively insightful in providing an additional perspective on the 
aforementioned questions and others tackled within this tome.  
To obtain possible answers, in the case of Guatemala this project first explored the 
broader outlines of its hegemonic canvas. This was done by tracing how race, racism, and 
political-economic roles and privileges intertwined with each other through the 
establishment of its colonial society, liberal and conservative governments of independent 
Guatemala, and later through the various military governments that dominated its 
landscape up to the end of the Cold War. Along that journey, the continuity of traditional 
Mayan institutions was charted and the rise of the intellectual Pan-Mayanist schools noted 
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as the Guatemalan indigenous movement progressed and matured under a brutal civil war 
that culminated in a genocide against Mayan communities in the early 1980s.  
Once this hegemonic canvas was established and the development of the Pan-
Mayan movement understood, this paper later then examined the elite-military-led 
counterreaction campaign against the movement’s demands for constitutional reforms via 
a popular referendum. At this stage, it became apparent that the Pan-Mayanist were 
hampered by a number of strategic weaknesses that compromised their campaign in the 
face of a strong, cohesive, and well-resourced counterreaction. These took the shape of a 
disconnect between the intellectuals that developed the ideas of Pan-Mayanism and the 
traditional Mayan political leaders who represented the continuities of Mayan customs, 
legal ideas, and social organization. This disadvantage was magnified by the movement’s 
inability to expand their political coalition beyond their largely-urban base and subjugation 
to broader ladino-leftist demands and discourses that were the central points of their 
URNG’s ally’s politics. Even though the movement enjoyed the direct and indirect support 
of a number of international state and non-state actors this was not enough to overcome 
their domestic liabilities.  
They were overwhelmed by the concerted campaign mounted by the military-
economic-political elites who leveraged their significant blocks in the national congress, a 
media blitz operation, and constitutional tools to dilute the indigenous demands within a 
convoluted and haphazardly written ballot. The opposition further beat back the Pan-
Mayanist through their limiting of polling stations and resurrecting racist tropes that had 
historically defined Guatemalan political discourse as far as its conceptions of indigeneity. 
Altogether, the opposition was able to effectively exploit the weaknesses and blockade the 
Pan-Mayanist attempts to leverage their demographic advantages and guarantee that the 
vote was rejected by three-quarters of voters who casted a ballot. With this ignominious 
defeat, the Pan-Mayanist dream of a plurinational state that granted rights, freedoms, and 
protections to the Mayan and other minority communities seemingly came to an end.  
In stark contrast, the indigenous project in Bolivia progressed under similar 
hegemonic arrangements that intersected the mediums of race, political and economic 
privileges, and cultural ideas that confined the indigenous population under a variety of 
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circumscribed regimes. As a result of the colonial legacy, independent Bolivia continued 
adapting these hegemonic tropes through successive forms of government whether they 
were oligarchic-republics, military juntas, or corporatist rulers. Traditional indigenous 
forms of organizing society and politics, embodied through the ayllus, continued under 
various guises that were projected onto them by the ruling elites as they shifted their 
ideologies. In the post-MNR-rule of the 1960–70s, the rise of the Kataristas resurrected 
indigenous mythologies and married these with political ideologies with critiques of 
capitalism and racism that they then connected with the indigenous unionist leaders who 
had inherited the political capital of the ayllus under the corporatist national institutions. 
Together, they experimented with various forms of political organization before and after 
the installment of a military junta that had come into power in 1966 and lasted until 1982. 
With the elites fractured by the constant struggles between conservative and liberal 
factions, the indigenista parties spawned by Katarismo attempted to achieve electoral 
victories in the 1980s and beyond with little support for their exclusionary-indigenista-
based messaging and demands. Not until the mid-1990s and with the emergence of 
neoliberalist economics in the post-Cold War, did Bolivia see successful mass indigenous 
political mobilization through the fading corporatist veneer that arose with the privatization 
of numerous state-owned enterprises and industrial sectors.  
Through various protest movements and the merging of class-based and identity-
based politics with populist rhetoric, the indigenous movements were able to add to the 
pressure on the fractured to liberalize the constitution and with the reforms of 1995 they 
achieved their first national victory. With the reforms in place, indigenous parties with 
more inclusionary appeal began gaining electoral traction through attacks upon the 
neoliberal elite-backed regime until their entry into the national congress in 2002. With 
Evo Morales as their leader, the indigenous parties further reached across other class-based 
and ethnic groups to create a populist coalition against the neoliberal elites that were finally 
toppled in 2005 with the election of Morales, Bolivia’s first self-identified indigenous 
president.  
In the aftermath of his 2005 victory, Morales and his MAS immediately began 
debating and pushing for a rewrite of the 1967 constitution that was then in force. With 
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elites’ influence diminished within national politics, the MAS was able to muscle the 
enabling legislation that authorized a special election for choosing the members of the 
constituent assembly which they dominated once again. However, MAS found itself 
relying heavily on their inclusionary program which made the arbiters between the 
indigenous parties and the traditional elites. After months of debate and committee work, 
the MAS and its allies were able to produce a constitutional proposal that reimagined 
Bolivia into a plurinational state that recognized indigenous rights, political institutions, 
and cultural freedoms. In 2009, this proposal was ratified through a national referendum 
can came into force later that year. The end result was interesting insomuch that it not only 
included the rearrangement of the Bolivian hegemonic system but the decoupling of power 
elements within and between hegemonic groups. Whereas the indigenous movement 
democratically seized the political sphere in Bolivia and thus sway over the state, what had 
been the hegemonic privileges of the traditional white elites had been reduced to 
regionalized economic dominance. These traditional elites were then relegated to the 
economic core of the eastern Bolivian departments where the political dominance of the 
indigenous parties had been nationalized.  
A number of interesting conclusions and lessons can be drawn from these two 
outcomes. It was found that the connection between traditional indigenous political organs 
and leaders—the principales in the municipalities of Guatemala and the caciques in the 
ayllus of Bolivia—and the intellectual elites that rooted political ideas in indigeneity 
proved decisive in the political unity and success of a movement. This lack of connections 
between traditional leaders and modernist intellectuals was missing in Guatemala and very 
much alive in Bolivia through Katarismo. Even though indigenous or indigenous-inspired 
intellectuals could be found in Guatemala—like Demetrio Cojtí Cuxil and others—but 
these did not build coordinating connections with the principales in order to mobilize 
across the Mayan political landscape. Considering that the opposite was true in Bolivia, 
this text theorizes that it is vital that indigenous activists and intellectuals ally with each 
other and include traditional local indigenous leadership and recruit them in creating a 
wider-accepted and operationalized political ideology that can unify different groups. 
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Without this cohesive messaging, any incipient movement is vulnerably to disruption or 
fragmentation.  
Other findings included that political and economic hegemony can in fact decouple 
from each other and potentially fragment hegemonic power in interesting ways that were 
unexpected at the beginning of this study. This was observed in Bolivia, where the elites 
had fractured so much that they could not mount a political offensive or defensive 
campaign against the growing MAS coalition. The result was an unanticipated 
reconfiguration of hegemonic arrangements, where the national means of domination that 
the white elites had employed in the past collapsed into regional versions of themselves 
along with those now-regional elites adopting political demands similar to that of the 
indigenous movement when it first began. These now-regionalized elites were all the 
suddenly for regional autonomy and protections, local control of resource exploitation 
decision, and decentralizing national authority. Quite an ironic twist. This last observation 
demonstrates both the importance of political and economic domination but also that the 
possibility that they can diverge is real. In Bolivia, possibly because of its democratic 
nature this resulted in a demographic ethnic-majority takeover of national political power 
and a concentration of wealth in a minority ethnic group.  
The other impact of these two constitutional outcomes is how in Guatemala there 
continues to be rampant discrimination and circumscription of indigenous peoples and to 
the present continues to experience waves of political and criminal violence that largely 
trace along ethnic lines.262 Crime preponderantly affects the urban poor who tend to be 
ethnic minorities that are caught in the racist cycle of poverty and dispossession. Would-
be immigrants tend to come from these communities as they look for greater opportunities 
abroad. Gangs and drug-trafficking tends to be common in indigenous areas and 
disproportionately affect their communities which are in turn denied or received diluted 
 
262 Maureen Taft-Morales, Guatemala: Political and Socioeconomic Conditions and U.S. Relations, 
CRS Report No. R42580 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 2019), 1, 3, 12–13, 15, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42580.pdf. 
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aid from the state because it does not see them.263 And thus, Guatemalan racism and neo-
coloniality continues to metastasize in various ways across various issues that have 
domestic and international consequences. 
Altogether, this project sought to contribute to the wider fields of constitution 
making, identity politics, race and racism and how these relate to ideas of power and 
governance among other arenas. It demonstrates the irreducibility of ethnic identity and its 
power to mobilize people in a such a manner that it can reshape a nation-state. It also posits 
that bringing historical perspectives and continuities is central to understanding the 
motivations, demands, and actions of central political actors and this is most evident in 
conflicts or struggles involving identity.  
Some of the limitations this study readily highlights mainly have to do with how 
outside powers influence and shape the hegemonic processes within a nation-state. For 
example, in Guatemala the United States played a central role in the government’s brutal 
civil war and supported the counterinsurgency campaigns that explicitly identified Mayan 
communities for eradication. Considering Guatemala’s demographic and the decoupling 
between political and economic power seen in Bolivia, could the elites in Guatemala had 
seen the nature of their dominance splinter in a similar fashion had they not had American 
support? Could this have steered the conflict differently? More research on the subject is 
needed. In Bolivia, had the United States not supported the military junta and instead 
allowed the corporatist government to continue could we have seen an earlier 
democratization without a mature and experienced Katarista movement? These questions 
take the subject into the international realm in acknowledgement that elites and subaltern 
groups do not solely exist in a domestic sense but also have international ties that need to 
be explored and accounted for.  
Another limitation of this study is that it does not do justice to the largest difference 
between Guatemala and Bolivia, that the former was a post-war state while the latter was 
 
263 Emiliano Rodríguez Mega, “Cocaine Trafficking is Destroying Central America’s Forests,” 
Science Magazine, June 16, 2017, https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/06/cocaine-trafficking-
destroying-central-america-s-forests; Diego Arguedas Ortiz, “How Indigenous Tribes are Fighting the Drug 
Cartels,” Vice News, April 2, 2014, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ypwvem/indigenous-tribes-vs-the-
drug-cartels. 
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not. How did having just emerged from a thirty-six civil war affect the growth and maturity 
of the Pan-Maya movement? How did the absence of war contribute to the Bolivian 
indigenous movements’ emergence? How do lingering war enmities affect political 
decision-making? This vital difference is worthy of its own thesis endeavor. It also does 
not tackle other facets of identity such as those intersections between race, class, and 
gender. Indigenous women are subject to unique experiences that are framed both through 
your race and gender in addition to their economic status and an exploration of how their 
stories, struggles, and contributions influenced the indigenous movements and wider 
identity politics of Latin America is sorely needed. Other avenues for further study include 
uncovering how did Gen Rios Montt’s party, the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), 
receive more than two-thirds of the vote in the second round of the 1999 Presidential 
Election six months after the failed referendum in a Maya-majority country?264 What fuels 
this curiosity even more is the fact that it was Gen Rios Montt who oversaw the genocidal 
campaigns against the Maya in 1980–1983. Was it disenfranchisement? The party politics 
or structures? Also, why did the Maya not expand their programmatic appeals beyond their 
indigenous base? What was the nature and intensity of the internal debates within 
Guatemala and Bolivia’s indigenous groups over ideological purity versus political 
networking and coalition broadening? 
All in all, the study of indigenous movements and their constitutional drive provides 
a highly didactical event that sheds light on the inner workings of identity politics in a 
region that has long been defined by them. In understanding indigenous struggles one can 
come closer to grasping the intricacies of managing centuries-old conflicts in the region, 
reimagine what it means to build an effective government, and how can policymaking in 
the region move beyond Euro-American models and embrace its autochthonous traditions. 
With ethnic conflicts having taken or taking place in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, between Haiti and Dominican Republic, and Mexico it behooves 
international policymakers to understand the foreign and domestic dimensions of identity 
 
264 “Guatemala: 1999 Presidential Elections Results/Second Round,” Georgetown University’s 
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politics and how these warp conflict resolutions.265 And with significant indigenous parties 
shaping national politics in, for example, Bolivia and Ecuador it becomes a greater 
imperative how indigenous beliefs and demands shape the national direction of these two 
important Andean countries and any others with significantly mobilized autochthonous 
communities. In the end, politics is a never-ending continuous struggle over the power to 
shape hegemony and its pertinent meanings, contours, and procedural outcomes.266 It 
hinges on a constellation of factors that come together to forge an identity which then 
serves as the fulcrum for not self-conception but also for imbuing the properties of power 
with its characters. Because peoples can never agree on the meanings of symbols, 
institutions, and constitutions there will always be struggles over the powers that control 
them in a cyclically endless way. 
 
265 For Argentina: Claudia Salomón Tarquini, “Procesos de subalternización de la población indígena 
en Argentina: los ranqueles en La Pampa, 1870–1970,” Revista de Indias, vol. LXXI, no. 252 (2011): 545–
70. For Brazil: Fernanda Frizzo Bragato and Pedro Bigolin Neto, “Conflitos territoriais indígenas no Brasil: 
entre risco e prevenção,” Direito e Praxis, vol. 8, no. 1 (March, 2017): 156–95. For Chile: Gilda Waldman, 
“Historical Memory and Present-Day Oblivion: The Mapuche Conflict in Post-Dictatorial Chile,” Time & 
Society, vol. 21, no. 1 (March, 2012): 55–70. For Ecuador: Marc Becker, Pachakutik: Indigenous 
Movements and Electoral Politics in Ecuador (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010). For 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic: Edward Paulino, Dividing Hispaniola: The Dominican Republic’s 
Border Campaign Against Haiti, 1930–1961 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016). For 
Mexico: “Murder in the Backwoods; Mexico’s Indigenous Conflicts.” The Economist, vol. 396, no. 8694 
(August 7, 2010). 
266 Florencia E. Mallon, Peasant and the Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995): 330.  
91 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Adams, Richard N. “The Evolution of Racism in Guatemala: Hegemony, Science, and 
Antihegemony.” Histories of Anthropology Annual, vol. 1 (2005): 132–80. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/haa.0.0011. 
Adamson, Walter L. Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci’s Political 
and Cultural Theory. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980. 
Albó, Xavier. Movimientos y poder indígena en Bolivia, Ecuador, y Perú [Indigenous 
Movements and Power in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru]. La Paz, Bolivia: Centro de 
Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado, 2008. 
Albó, Xavier. “¿...Y de kataristas o mnristas? La sorprendente y audaz alianza entre 
aymaras y neoliberals en Bolivia [Of Kataristas and MNRistas? The Surprisingly 
Audacious Alliance between Aymaras and Neoliberals in Bolivia].” Boletín de 
Antropología Americana, vol. 25 (July 1992): 54–92. http://search.proquest.com/
docview/1311050361/. 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. New York: Verso, 2016. 
Arguedas Ortiz, Diego. “How Indigenous Tribes are Fighting the Drug Cartels.” Vice. 
April 2, 2014. https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ypwvem/indigenous-tribes-vs-
the-drug-cartels. 
Arias, Arturo. “Changing Indian Identity: Guatemala’s Violent Transition to Modernity.” 
In Guatemalan Indians and the State 1540–1988, edited by Carol A. Smith, 
assisted by Marilyn M. Moors, 230–357. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 
1992. 
Arredondo, Mariella I. “Born Indigenous, Growing Up Mestizos: Schooling and Youth in 
Arequipa, Peru.” In Mestizaje and Globalization, edited by Stefanie Wickstrom 
and Philip D. Young, 77–91. Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona Press, 2014. 
Artaraz, Kepa. Bolivia: Refounding the Nation. London: Pluto Press, 2012. 
Aymara and Quechua Peasant Organizations. “In the Name of Katari.” In The Bolivia 
Reader: History, Culture, Politics, edited by Sinclair Thompson, Rossana 
Barragán, Xavier Albó, Seemin Qayum, and Mark Goodale, 439–446. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2018. 
92 
Azpuru, Dinorah et al. The Popular Referendum (Consulta Popular) and the Future of 
the Peace Process in Guatemala, working paper 241, Latin American Program 
Working Papers. Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center, 1999. 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/
Working%20Paper%20241.pdf. 
Barragán, Rossana. “The Census and the Making of a Social ‘Order’ in Nineteenth-
Century Bolivia.” In Histories of Race and Racism, edited by Laura Gotkowitz, 
113–33. Dunham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011. 
Bastos, Santiagos. “La movilización Maya en Guatemala: exigiendo derechos y 
construyendo multiculturalidad en un contexto de postconflicto [The Mayan 
Mobilization in Guatemala: Demanding Rights and Constructing Multiculturalism 
in a Post-Conflict Environment].” Cahiers des Amériques latines [Latin American 
Notebooks], vol. 60, no. 61 (Paris, France: 1985): 41–58. http://cal.revues.org/
1376.  
Becker, Marc. Pachakutik: Indigenous Movements and Electoral Politics in Ecuador. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010. 
Berger, Susan. “Guatemala: Coup and Countercoup.” NACLA Report on the Americas 
vol. 27, no. 1 (July/August 1993): 4–7. https://doi.org/10.1080/
10714839.1993.11723020. 
Blasier, Cole. The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin 
America 1910–1985. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985. 
Brett, Mark G. Social Movements, Indigenous Politics and Democratisation in 
Guatemala, 1985–1996. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2008. 
Bucheli, Marcelo. “Multinational Corporations, Totalitarian Regimes and Economic 
Nationalism: United Fruit Company in Central America, 1899–1975.” Business 
History 50, no. 4 (July 2008): 433–54. https://doi.org/10.1080/
00076790802106315. 
Butler, Kim D. and Aline Helg. “Race in Postabolition Afro-Latin America.” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Latin American History, edited by Jose C. Moya, 257–80. 
Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Calla, Andrés and Khantuta Muruchi. “Transgressions and Racism: The Struggle over a 
New Constitution in Bolivia.” In Histories of Race and Racism, edited by Laura 
Gotkowitz, 299–310. Dunham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011. 
Calvert, Peter. Guatemala: A Nation in Turmoil. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. 
93 
Canessa, Andrew. “Contesting Hybridity: Evangelistas and Kataristas in Highland 
Bolivia.” Journal of Latin American Studies vol. 32, No. 1 (February 2000): 115–
44. https://www.jstor.org/stable/157782. 
Carey, David. “Maya Perspectives on the 1999 Referendum in Guatemala: Ethnic 
Equality Rejected?” Latin American Perspectives 31, no. 6 (November 2004): 69–
95. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X04270640. 
Castro, Juan and Picq, Manuela L. “Stateness as Landgrab: A Political History of Maya 
Dispossession in Guatemala.” American Quarterly, vol. 69, no. 4 (2017): 791–99. 
Comisión para el Esclaracimiento Histórico [Historical Clarification Commission]. 
Guatemala: Memory of Silence / Tz’inil Na’Tab’al: Report of the Commission for 
Historical Clarification, Conclusions, and Recommendations, 12 vols. 
Guatemala: United Nations, 1999. https://hrdag.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/
CEHreport-english.pdf. 
Crenshaw, Kimberlé. “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color.” In Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings 
that Formed the Movement, edited by Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary 
Peller, and Kendall Thomas, 357–83. New York: The New Press, 1995. 
D’Altroy, Terence N. The Incas, 2nd ed. Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2015. 
Dell, Melissa. “The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining Mita.” Econometrica vol. 78, no. 
6 (November 2010): 1863–1903. DOI: 10.3982/ECTA8121. 
de La Fuente, Manuel. “A Personal View: The Water in Cochabamba, Bolivia: 
Privatization Triggers an Uprising.” Mountain Research and Development, vol. 
23, no. 1 (February 2003): 98–100. 
de la Rosa, Katarina and M. Angeles Villareal. Dominican Republic-Central America-
United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), CRS Report No. IFI0394. 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10394. 
de la Torre, Carlos. “Racism in Education and the Construction of Citizenship in 
Ecuador.” Race & Class, vol. 42, no. 2 (October 2000): 33–45. 
Drouin, Marc. “Understanding the 1982 Guatemalan Genocide.” In State Violence and 
Genocide in Latin America the Cold War Years, edited by Marcia Esparza, Henry 
R. Huttenbach, and Daniel Feierstein, 81–103. London: Routledge, 2010. 
Elías, José. “Héctor Gramajo, ex ministro de [ex-minister of] Guatemala.” El País. March 
22, 2004. https://elpais.com/diario/2004/03/22/agenda/1079910007_850215.html. 
94 
Ekern, Stener. “The Production of Autonomy: Leadership and Community in Mayan 
Guatemala.” Journal of Latin American Studies 43, no. 1 (February 2011): 93–
119. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X1000180X. 
Esquit, Edgar. “Nationalist Contradictions: Pan-Mayanism, Representations of the Past, 
and the Reproduction of inequalities in Guatemala.” In Decolonizing Native 
Histories: Collaboration, Knowledge, and Language in the Americas, edited by 
Florencia Mallon, 196–218. Dunham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012. 
Fauriol, Georges A. and Eva Loser. Guatemala’s Political Puzzle. New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction, 1988. 
Fernández, Blanca S. and Florencia Puente. “Configuración y demandas de los 
movimientos sociales hacia la Asamblea Constituyente en Bolivia y Ecuador [The 
Nature of Social Movements and their Demands Towards the Constituent 
Assemblies in Bolivia and Ecuador].” Íconos: Revista de Ciencias Sociales no. 44 
(2012): 49–65. 
Frizzo Bragato, Fernanda and Pedro Bigolin Neto. “Conflitos territoriais indígenas no 
Brasil: entre risco e prevenção [Indigenous Territorial Conflicts in Brazil: 
Between Risk and Prevention.” Direito e Praxis [Law and Praxis] vol. 8, no. 1 
(March 2017): 156–95. 
Gamboa Rocabado, Franco. Dilemas y conflictos sobre la Constitución en Bolivia: 
Historia política de la asamblea Constituyente [Dilemas and Conflicts over the 
Constitution in Bolivia: A Political History of the Constituent Assembly]. La Paz, 
Bolivia: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung e.V., 2009. 
General Banzer Suárez, Hugo. “The Military-Peasant Pact.” In The Bolivia Reader: 
History, Culture, Politics, edited by Sinclair Thompson, Rossana Barragán, 
Xavier Albó, Seemin Qayum, and Mark Goodale, 437–8. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2018. 
Georgetown University’s Political Database of the Americas. “Guatemala: 1999 
Presidential Elections Results/Second Round.” Updated February 11, 2000, 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Guate/99elec2.html. 
Georgetown University’s Political Database of the Americas. “Guatemala: 1995 House of 
Deputies Election.” Updated March 29, 2001. http://pdba.georgetown.edu/
Elecdata/Guate/leg95.html. 
Georgetown University’s Political Database of the Americas. “Republic of Bolivia: 1967 
Constitution with 1994 Reforms, agreed text of 1995 and reforms of 2002, 2004, 
and 2005.” Updated July 16, 2008. http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/
Bolivia/consboliv2005.html. 
95 
Georgetown University’s Political Database of the Americas, “Republic of Bolivia: 2005 
Presidential Election Results.” Updated January 18, 2006. 
https://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Bolivia/pres05.html 
Georgetown University’s Political Database of the Americas. “Bolivia: 2009 
Constitutional Referendum Results.” Updated January 25, 2009. 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Bolivia/refconstit09.html. 
Geertz, Clifford. “Primordial Ties.” In Ethnicity, edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony 
D. Smith, 40–4. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Geertz, Clifford. The Interpretation of Cultures, 3rd ed. New York: Basic Books, 2017. 
Gotanda, Neil. “A Critique of ‘Our Constitution is Color-Blind.’” In Critical Race 
Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the Movement, edited by Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas, 257–75. New York: 
The New Press, 1995.  
Gotkowitz, Laura. A Revolution for Our Rights: Indigenous Struggles for Land and 
Justice in Bolivia, 18880-1952. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007.  
Graham, David A. “The Stubborn Persistence of Confederate Monuments.” The Atlantic, 
April 26, 2016. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/the-
stubborn-persistence-of-confederate-monuments/479751/. 
Grandin, Greg. Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2000. 
Grosby, Steven. “The Inexpungable Tie of Primordiality.” In Ethnicity, edited by John 
Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 51–6. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
2009. 
Hale, Charles R. “Mistados, Cholos, and the Negation of Identity in the Guatemalan 
Highlands.” In Histories of Race and Racism, edited by Laura Gotkowitz, 254–
77. Dunham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011. 
Hale, Charles R. “The Authorized Indian.” In The Guatemala Reader: History, Culture, 
Politics, edited by Greg Grandin, Deborah T. Levenson, and Elizabeth Oglesby, 
517–22. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011. 
Hammond, John L. “Indigenous Community Justice in the Bolivian Constitution of 
2009.” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 33 (2011): 649–81. 
Herrarte, Gustavo. “El CACIF es más influyente que los partidos en el congreso [CACIF 
is more influential than political parties in congress].” Plaza Pública. Last 
modified August 15, 2012. https://www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/el-cacif-es-
mas-influyente-que-los-partidos-en-el-congreso.  
96 
Hochstetler, Kathryn. “Social Movements in Latin America.” In Routledge Handbook of 
Latin American Politics, edited by Peter Kingstone and Deborah J. Yashar, 237–
48. London: Routledge, 2012. 
Holzinger, Katharina et al. “The Constitutionalization of Indigenous Group Rights, 
Traditional Political Institutions, and Customary Law.” Comparative Political 
Studies vol. 52, no. 12 (2018): 177–1809. 
Hood, Lucy. “Private Sector Threatens Nationwide Strike.” United Press International 
Archives. April 18, 1985. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1985/04/18/Private-
sector-threatens-nationwide-strike/9578482648400/ 
Htun, Mala. Inclusion without Representation in Latin America: Gender Quotas and 
Ethnic Reservations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016. 
International Labour Organization. “C169 - Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 
1989 (No. 169).” Accessed April 9, 2020. https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/
f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C169. 
Jackson, James K. U.S. Trade with Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Partners. CRS Report 
No. R44044. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 2018. 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44044. 
Jonas, Susanne. Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala’s Peace Process. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 2000. 
Kading, Terrance W. “The Guatemalan Military and the Economics of La Violencia.” 
Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, vol. 24, no. 47 
(1999): 57–91. https://doi.org/10.1080/08263663.1999.10816776. 
Karatnycky, Adrian, editor. Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights 
and Civil Liberties 1998–1999. New York, New York: Freedom House, 1999. 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/Guatemala 
Kendi, Ibram X. Stamped from the Beginning: The Definitive History of Racist Ideas in 
America. New York: Bold Type Books, 2016. 
Klein, Herbert S. A Concise History of Bolivia, 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011. 
Konefal, Betsy. “Defending the Pueblo [Defending the town]: Indigenous Identity and 
Struggles for Social Justice in Guatemala, 1970–1980.” Social Justice vol. 30, no. 
3 (2003): 32–47. 
Kurtz, Marcus J. “The Dilemmas of Democracy in the Open Economy - Lessons from 
Latin America.” World Politics 56, no. 2 (January 2004): 262–302. 
97 
Larson, Brooke. “Forging the Unlettered Indian.” In Histories of Race and Racism, edited 
by Laura Gotkowitz, 299–310. Dunham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011. 
Liu, Amy H. and Kevin Peters. “The Hanification of Xinjiang, China: The Economic 
Effects of the Great Leap West.” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism vol. 17, no. 
2 (2017): 265–80. 
Longley, Kyle. The Sparrow and The Hawk: Costa Rica and The United States during 
the Rise of José Figueres. Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 
1997. 
Madrid, Raúl L. The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
Malešević, Siniša. Identity as Ideology: Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism, 1st ed. 
London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006. 
Mallon, Florencia E. Peasant and the Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and 
Peru. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995. 
Manz, Beatriz. Paradise in Ashes: A Guatemalan Journey of Courage, Terror, and Hope. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004. 
Marka Tola, Santos and the Cacique Apoderados. “The Laws of the Land.” In The 
Bolivia Reader: History, Culture, Politics, edited by Sinclair Thompson, Rossana 
Barragán, Xavier Albó, Seemin Qayum, and Mark Goodale, 327–30. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2018. 
Mauro, Annalisa and Michel Merlet. Access to Land and Recognition of Land Rights in 
Guatemala. Rome, Italy: International Land Coalition, June 2003. 
https://www.humanitarianlibrary.org/sites/default/files/2013/05/
kpguatemala03.pdf 
Melucci, Alberto. Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in 
Contemporary Society. Edited by John Keane and Paull Miller. London: Century 
Hutchinson Ltd., 1989. 
Meyer, Peter J. 2018 Summit of the Americas. CRS Report No. IFI0863. Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, April 2018. https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/IF/IF10863. 




Murra, John V. “Verticality and Complementarity.” In The Bolivia Reader: History, 
Culture, Politics, edited by Sinclair Thompson, Rossana Barragán, Xavier Albó, 
Seemin Qayum, and Mark Goodale, 27–33. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2018. 
Otzoy, Antonio. “Guatemala The Struggle for Maya Unity.” NACLA Report on the 
Americas, vol. 29, no. 5 (March 1996): 33–35. https://doi.org/10.1080/
10714839.1996.11725758. 
Pallister, Kevin. “Why No Mayan Party? Indigenous Movements and National Politics in 
Guatemala.” Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 55, no. 3 (September 
2013): 117–38. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2013.00205.x. 
Paulino, Edward. Dividing Hispaniola: The Dominican Republic’s Border Campaign 
Against Haiti, 1930–1961. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016. 
Peller, Gary. “Race Consciousness.” In Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that 
Formed the Movement, edited by Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, 
and Kendall Thomas, 127–58. New York: The New Press, 1995. 
Picketty, Thomas. Capital and Ideology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2020. 
Postero, Nancy. “The Struggle to Create a Radical Democracy in Bolivia.” Latin 
American Studies Association, vol. 45, special issue (2010): 59–78. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.2010.0035. 
Postero, Nancy. The Indigenous State: Race, Politics, and Performance in Plurinational 
Bolivia. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2017. 
Reinaga, Fausto. “Iconoclast and Prophet.” In The Bolivia Reader: History, Culture, 
Politics, edited by Sinclair Thompson, Rossana Barragán, Xavier Albó, Seemin 
Qayum, and Mark Goodale, 399–406. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018. 
“Revolutionary Currents.” In The Bolivia Reader: History, Culture, Politics, edited by 
Sinclair Thompson, Rossana Barragán, Xavier Albó, Seemin Qayum, and Mark 
Goodale, 323–27. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018. 
Rodríguez Mega, Emiliano. “Cocaine Trafficking is Destroying Central America’s 
Forests.” Science Magazine. June 16, 2017. https://www.sciencemag.org/news/
2017/06/cocaine-trafficking-destroying-central-america-s-forests. 




Rohter, Larry. “The Specter in Guatemala.” The New York Times. January 10, 1996, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/10/world/the-specter-in-guatemala.html. 
Romero, Simon. “Bolivians Ratify New Constitution.” The New York Times. January 25, 
2009. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/26/world/americas/26bolivia.html. 
Salomón Tarquini, Claudia. “Procesos de subalternización de la población indígena en 
Argentina: los ranqueles en La Pampa, 1870–1970 [The subalternazation of the 
indigenous population in Argentina: the ranqueles in the grasslands, 1870-1970].” 
Revista de Indias vol. LXXI, no. 252 (2011): 545–70. 
Schlesinger, Stephen and Stephen Kinzer. Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup 
in Guatemala. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005. 
Shriar, Avrum J. “Roads to Poverty: Exploring the Impacts of Economic Integration on 
Socioeconomic Conditions and Land Use in Northern Guatemala.” Journal of 
Planning Education and Research 28, no. 4 (June 2009): 456–69. doi:10.1177/
0739456X08329472. 
Shultz, Jim and Melissa Crane Draper, editors. Dignity and Defiance. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2008. 
Siekmeier, James F. “Trailblazer Diplomat: Bolivian Ambassador Víctor Andrade 
Uzquiano’s Efforts to Influence U.S. Policy, 1944–162.” Diplomatic History, vol. 
28, no. 3 (June 2004): 385–406. 
Smith, Anthony. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 
1986. 
Smith, Carol A. “Introduction: Social Relations in Guatemala over Time and Space.” In 
Guatemalan Indians and the State 1540–1988, edited by Carol A. Smith, assisted 
by Marilyn M. Moors, 1–34. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1992. 
Taft-Morales, Maureen. Guatemala: Political and Socioeconomic Conditions and U.S. 
Relations. CRS Report No. R42580. Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, March 2019. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42580.pdf. 
Tamayo, Franz. “Resurrection of the Race.” In The Bolivia Reader: History, Culture, 
Politics, edited by Sinclair Thompson, Rossana Barragán, Xavier Albó, Seemin 
Qayum, and Mark Goodale, 331–36. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018. 
Taracena Arriola, Arturo. “From Assimilation to Segregation: Guatemala 1800–1944.” In 
Histories of Race and Racism, edited by Laura Gotkowitz, 95–112. Dunham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2011. 
Van Cott, Donna L. The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in 
Latin America. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000. 
100 
Van Cott, Donna L. From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of 
Ethnic Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005.  
Vasconcelos, José. “The Cosmic Race.” In The Mexico Reader: History, Culture, 
Politics, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Timothy J. Henderson, 15–9. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2002. 
Waldman, Gilda M. “Historical Memory and Present-Day Oblivion: The Mapuche 
Conflict in Post-Dictatorial Chile.” Time & Society vol. 21, no. 1 (2012): 55–70. 
Warren, Kay B. Indigenous Movements and Their Critics: Pan-Maya Activism in 
Guatemala. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. 
Warren, Kay B. “Voting Against Indigenous Rights in Guatemala: Lessons from the 1999 
Referendum.”  In Indigenous Movements, Self-Representation, and the State in 
Latin America, edited by Kay B. Warren and Jean E. Jackson, 149–80. Austin, 
TX: University of Texas Press, 2003. 
Wilson, Bruce M. Costa Rica: Politics, Economics, and Democracy. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1998. 
Winn, Peter. Americas: The Changing Face of Latin America and the Caribbean. 3rd ed. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006. 
Woodward, Jr., Ralph L. “Changes in the Nineteenth-Century Guatemalan State.” In 
Guatemalan Indians and the State 1540–1988, edited by Carol A. Smith, assisted 
by Marilyn M. Moors, 52–71. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1992. 
Yashar, Deborah J. Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous 
Movements and the Postliberal Challenge. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
Yashar, Deborah J. “Does Race Matter in Latin America? How Racial and Ethnic 
Identities Shape the Region’s Politics.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 94, no. 2 (March-
April 2015): 33–40. 
101 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
